Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 20
Issue 3 August 1987

Article 3

1987

Dialing for Foreign Telecommunications Market Access: Is The
United States Getting a Busy Signal from Japan?
Robert E. Boone, III

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Communications Law Commons, and the International Trade Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert E. Boone, III, Dialing for Foreign Telecommunications Market Access: Is The United States Getting
a Busy Signal from Japan?, 20 Vanderbilt Law Review 495 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol20/iss3/3

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Dialing for Foreign Telecommunications
Market Access: Is The United States
Getting a Busy Signal from Japan?
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

II.

INTRODUCTION ......................................

496

TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICIES .....................

497
497
504

A.
B.
III.

Development in Japan .......................
The Current United States Market .............

OVERVIEW

OF

THE

ELECTRIC TELECOMMUNICATION

1984 ...........................
Scope of the ETB Act ........................
MPT Authority under the ETB Act ............

BUSINESS ACT OF

A.
B.
IV.

ISSUES

A.
B.

V.

RAISED BY THE JAPANESE LEGISLATION ......

Primary Objectives of the United States in Resolving the Issues ..............................
Major Telecommunications Issues Between the
United States and Japan .....................
1. Foreign Representation on Japanese Advisory
Councils ..............................
2. Japanese Standards for Certification and Approval of Equipment and Services .........
3.
The Telecommunications Trade Deficit with
Japan ................................

THE UNITED

STATES

RESPONSE

517
518
518
522
525

TO THE JAPANESE

LEGISLATION AND THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

TRADE

DEFICIT ............................................

530

A.

532
532
537

B.
VI.

509
509
514
516

Legislative Responses in 1985 and 1986 .......
1. The Danforth Bill ......................
2.
The Telecommunications Trade Act of 1986.
a. The Committee on Energy and Commerce Version of H.R. 3131 ..........
b. The Committee on Ways and Means
Version of, H.R. 3131 ...............
1987 Proposals.............................

CONCLUSION .......................................

538
543
546
547

496

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

I.

[Vol. 20.495

INTRODUCTION

Telecommunications is one of the most rapidly changing high technology industries in the world today. Whereas governmental and natural
monopolies once created a stable and predictable environment for this
industry on both a national and international level, the telecommunications industry now has become more complex due to interlocking relationships between telecommunications firms, manufacturers and operators that have resulted from the trend to deregulate national networks.
Although still in its nascent stage, United States deregulation has signaled a change in global telecommunications policies by opening its telecommunications market to foreign competitors. Naturally, the United
States encourages other countries to adopt similar policies in an effort to
achieve access to foreign markets for its domestic telecommunications
firms.
Japan is one country that appears to be following United States policies. On April 1, 1985, the Japanese Government converted Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTT) from a governmentrun, publicly-held corporation into a private entity.1 Japan adopted the
Electric Telecommunication Business Act 2 in December 1984 to create
an environment in which private entities can compete. The full extent to
which the Japanese Government intends to open its market to non-Japanese firms remains unclear. This Note will discuss the development of
Japanese telecommunications policy and the current United States telecommunications policy with respect to market access. The Note then will
analyze the new Japanese legislation generally and issues relating to
United States-Japan trade relations specifically. Finally, this Note will
comment on United States legislative responses to the trade deficit with
Japan and the future of United States-Japan telecommunications trade
relations.

1. Nippon Denshin Denwa Kabushikigaisha H'o (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
Company Act), Law No. 85 of 1984, reprinted in [Statute Vol. 1] DOING BUSINESS IN
JAPAN App. 1A-40.2 (Kitagawa ed. 1986); see infra notes 91-101 and accompanying
text.
2. Denki Tsiishin Jigy H'o (Electric Telecommunication Business Act), Law No. 86
of 1985 (unofficial translation). See infra notes 90-155 and accompanying text for an indepth discussion of the Electric Telecommunication Business Act.
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II.

TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICIES

A. Development in Japan
Prior to 1952, the Japanese Government operated the country's telecommunications services8 under a monopolistic scheme in which direct
government control severely limited private sector involvement.4 In 1952,
however, the Japanese Government, concluding that an independent
public corporation could more efficiently and flexibly operate the telephone and telegraph systems,5 created the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation for domestic communications.' The Japanese
Government established the Kokusai Denshin Denwa Co., Ltd. (KDD)7
the following year and enacted major legislation8 that would serve as the
country's primary telecommunications law until the adoption of the

3. T. Kosugi, New Developments in the Telecommunications Industry 2 (Apr. 18,
1985) (text of speech presented to the Practicing Law Institute in New York on May 24,
1985) [hereinafter Kosugi]. Japan's telegraph naturally started as a direct government
enterprise by the Ministry of Technology in 1869. Ito, Recent Trends in Telecommunications Regulations and Markets in Japan (with an Afterward), 25 JURIMETRIcS J. 70,
72 (1984) [hereinafter Recent Trends]. Japanese private industries were incapable at
that time of engaging in new industry. See id. When the telephone debuted in Japan in
1877, however, a handful of private businesses wished to enter that business field. Id.
Although controversy over the structure of the telephone business lasted for approximately 12 years, the Japanese Government determined in 1889 that the telephone should
be operated as a monopoly like the telegraph because direct government control would
(1) preserve secrecy of communications and (2) avoid delays in telecommunications developments in rural areas. Id.
4. Kosugi, supra note 3, at 2. During this period of government-run monopolies, the
Ministry of Communications, which took over control of the telegraph in 1885 from the
Ministry of Technology, Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 72, required anyone wishing to
construct private telecommunications lines to obtain its prior permission. R. Bruce, J.
Cunard & M. Director, Telecommunications Structure Study, Country Report: Japan
10 (International Institute of Communications, London, June 12, 1985) [hereinafter
Country Report].
5. See Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 73. Much of Japan's telecommunications
industry suffered serious damage in World War II; consequently, the Japanese Government felt a need not only to rebuild but also to strengthen the country's network. See id.
6. NTT was created by the Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Public Corporation
Act of 1952. Nippon Denshin Denwa Kosha Ho (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone
Public Corporation Act), Law No. 250 of 1952; Kosugi, supra note 3, at 2.
7. KDD was established for international telecommunications services. Recent
Trends, supra note 3, at 73.
8. The two 1953 laws, the Cable Telecommunications Act, Yusen Denki Tsiishin
H6, Law No. 96 of 1953, and the Public Telecommunications Act, Koshu Denki
Tsiishin H5, Law No. 97 of 1953, were designed in tandem to establish and preserve the
monopolies of NTT and KDD. Country Report, supra note 4, at 11.
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Electric Telecommunication Business Act of 1985.'
The laws enacted in 1952 and 1953 transferred a large part of the
Ministry of Telecommunications10 to the newly created NTT and
KDD. 11 Japan's Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications (MPT), 2
an agency analogous to the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
in the United States, 13 absorbed the remaining regulatory sections of the
old ministry. 4 Although structurally quite different from the prior government monopoly, this so-called public telecommunications network
functioned, in effect, as an organ of the Japanese Government." 5 The

9. Denki Tsiishin Jigyo H (Electric Telecommunications Business Act), Law No.
86 of 1984.
10. The Japanese Government divided the Ministry of Communications into two
new ministries after World War II-the Ministry of Postal Services and the Ministry of
Telecommunications. Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 73.
11. Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 73.
12. The Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications, or Yusei sh'-, evolved from the
Ministry of Postal Services. Id. The MPT is the central regulatory agency with respect
to telecommunications operations in Japan, both on a national and an international level.
13. The FCC was created by the Communications Act of 1934 as an independent
regulatory agency responsible directly to Congress. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-611 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1987). The President appoints the agency's Commissioners subject to approval by the
Senate; however, the FCC is not a part of the executive branch, nor does it serve as a
puppet for the President. The FCC regulates both interstate and foreign commerce in the
telecommunications arena for the purposes of preserving national security, ensuring the
availability of safe, rapid and efficient telecommunications services and facilities to the
general public, and securing uniform policies with respect to present and future goals of
the nation through the central authority. See id. § 151. FCC activities, on the national
and international level include but are not limited to: rate setting, approval of construction and operation of communications facilities, assignment of radio frequencies, tariffs,
and approval of services offered. See SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND
TRANSPORTATION,

LONG RANGE GOALS IN INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

AN OUTLINE FOR UNITED STATES POLICY, 98th Cong., Ist Sess.
74 (Comm. Print 1983) [hereinafter LONG RANGE GOALS]. Thus, decisions and activities by the FCC directly affect international trade and foreign policy. For a detailed
discussion of the structure and interaction of U.S. governmental bodies in the telecommunications area, see id. at 67-96.
14. Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 73. NTT and KDD took over much of the
functions of the Ministry of Telecommunications, see supra note 10, after the new laws
went into effect.
15. Kosugi, supra note 3, at 2. The Japanese Government felt that the telecommunications sector could be managed most efficiently as a monopoly due to: (1) the close
relationship between telecommunications and compelling public interests, for example,
the right of privacy; (2) the tendency toward a monopolistic scheme due to the inherently
large capital investment requirements of the industry; and (3) the necessity of national
interface standards for the country's network. NIPPON TELEGRAPH & TELEPHONE,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM AND NTT PRIVATIZATION 1-2 (1985) [hereinafter
AND INFORMATION,
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1952 and 1953 laws protected NTT and KDD 1 by giving each virtual
control of their respective facilities and services.17 Due to this control,
both NTT and KDD expanded and developed their networks without
the threat of competition.1 8 Thus, although NTT and KDD were separate entities, the Japanese Government maintained its monopoly of the
public telecommunications network.1 9
Over the past twenty years, Japan's control over its public telecommunications industry has undergone very significant and often reluctant
changes.2" During the middle 1960s, the Japanese business community
exerted competitive pressures on NTT through rapid technological advancements in telecommunications media 21 and growth of the computer
industry. 2 Private entities questioned the efficacy of the public monopoly's restrictive policies concerning the use of NTT's communications
circuits for data transmissions and facsimile communications2 3 and demanded amendment of the proscriptive laws and regulations. 24 The unavailability of communications alternatives posed an almost insurmountable obstacle to the needs of the infant information processing industry. 5

TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM].

16. TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM, supra note 15, at 1-2. For a brief summary of
the two 1953 telecommunications laws, see Country Report, supra note 4, at 11-14. See
also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
17. Country Report, supra note 4, at 11.
18. Id. at 12. Although the Cable Telecommunications Act appeared to liberalize
pre-existing policy by permitting private entrepreneurs to construct wire facilities, the
MPT nevertheless retained control over the development of any such facility that might
affect the public telecommunications sector. Id. at 13. Thus, private facilities could not
effectively compete with the public network, nor could they carry third-party communications. Id. These limitations "guaranteed that NTT and KDD would operate as the
sole public telecommunications service providers." Id.
19. See Kosugi, supra note 3, at 2. For example, the laws prohibited shared use of
leased lines, interconnection of privately operated facilities with the government-created
network, and provision by third-parties of message switching services to the public.
Country Report, supra note 4, at 13.
20. See Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 74.
21. See id.; Country Report, supra note 4, at 14. Two types of new telecommunication media were data transmission and facsimile communication.
22. Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 74.
23. See generally supra notes 11-19 and accompanying text.
24. Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 74; see Country Report, supra note 4, at 14.
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI), or Ts~isan sh-o, advocated
these demands because one of its main objectives since the early 1970s was to develop
and strengthen the telecommunications and information industries into Japan's primary
"strategic industries." Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 74.
25. Country Report, supra note 4, at 14.
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The MPT2" responded to these needs by permitting the network to ac27
commodate, at least to some extent, some of the new business traffic.
Many approval requirements, however, remained intact.28
During the 1980s, the Japanese telecommunications industry has witnessed its most significant advancement. 29 Shifting policy considerations,30 a variety of market forces, 1 and the accomplishment of at least

26. The Japanese Government amended the Public Telecommunications Act with
proposals submitted by the MPT. Id.
27. For example, one alternative in which data were transmitted over the NTT system was through the authorized use of a private, leased line (called a "specified circuit");
the other available alternative was to transmit directly through public circuits. See id.
The MPT permitted shared use of a specified circuit by private affiliated users when (a)
the users have a "considerable" business relationship with each other, and (b) the MPT
concluded that the proposed use of the circuit would not pose a threat to the NTT
system. See id. at 15 (the MPT also permitted certain categorical arrangements with
respect to specified circuits). This standard obviously compromised concerns of both
NTT and private users. Id. at 16. Users that were closely affiliated with each other, or
even intra-corporate entities, could share a specific circuit and more efficiently and economically transmit intra-corporate or industry-related data. See id. at 15-16. NTT was
concerned about shared use arrangements because they had the potential to harm the
public network by duplicating functions it carried out. "There was less concern about
message-switching activities between closely-related users than between unaffiliated parties." Id. at 15. The close relation requirement substantially dissolved any threats of a
third-party transmission service that would directly compete with NTT. See id.
28. The 1971 amendments did not authorize value-added services by third-parties.
Users of leased circuits could not transmit third-party communications. This prevented
users of the NTT network from offering their data processing capacity to other businesses or individuals. Users could only provide such services when the third-party's
equipment was connected to the user's equipment through public circuits. Id. at 18.
29. See generally Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 74-77; Country Report, supra
note 4, at 19-24; Kosugi, supra note 3, at 3-5.
30. See Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 74-77 (general analysis of Japanese policy
considerations based on several telecommunications studies conducted in the 1980s by
special committees); Country Report, supra note 4, at 19-45 (detailed overview of deregulation trends); see generally Kosugi, supra note 3, at 3-5 (capsulated summary of events
affecting policy changes which lead to the new law).
31. Japanese consumers, due to rapid economic development and improved living
standards, demanded a broader, more sophisticated range of products and services. TELECOMMUNICATIONS REFORM, supra note 15, at 2. These demands would have forced
NTT to expand its range of services into new areas. One major concern of the Japanese
business community was whether NTT should be allowed to operate outside the scope of
its traditional transmissions services, which consisted primarily of telephone, telex, telegram and circuit leasing services. NTT had the resources and desire to engage in the
potentially lucrative, new telecommunications fields, particularly the value-added service
markets. But it later became apparent that NTT could not maintain a monopoly over
these new areas, too. See Country Report, supra note 4, at 23-24.
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two post-World War II goals of the Japanese Government 2 contributed
to uncertainty for the future of Japan's telecommunications market. The
most significant change in Japanese telecommunications policy concerned
the MPT's and NTT's position on deregulation in the telecommunications industry.3 3 In October 1980 the MPT formed a special task force,
the Telecommunications Policy Council (the Council),3 4 to "clarify
guidelines for Japanese telecommunications policies in the 1980s.''35 The
Council drafted the first report3" to formally address Japan's deregulation policy 7 and indicated that the MPT intended to maintain the present structure of basic telecomunications services provided by the NTT
and KDD monopolies. The Council made the following recommendations against deregulation:
(1) Basic facilities such as nationwide and international communication
circuits should be monopolistically provided by NTT and KDD for the
most effective use of resources and prevention of investment overlap.
(2) Basic common carrier services such as telephone and telegraph should
continue to be NTT and KDD monopolies.3 8
A third major recommendation, however, indicated some support for
deregulation:
(3) However, as for enhanced services such as data communication and
various forms of information services, the deregulation policy which
started in 1971 should be further promoted. In these areas competition
should be encouraged."9

32. See Kosugi, supra note 3, at 3. The two major goals were (1)solving the problem of telephone connection delay, or "backlog" and (2) establishing a national automatic
telephone dialing network.
33. See Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 77.
34. The Japanese Telecommunications Policy Bureau initiated the organization of
the Council, which was composed of many experts in academics, business, telecommunications and mass media.
35. Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 75.
36. A Vision of Telecommunications Policy in the '80s, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
POLICY COUNCIL (August 1981) (English translation published by the Research Institute of Telecommunications and Economics in August 1982), reprinted in Recent
Trends, supra note 3, at 75.
37. Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 75.
38. A Vision of Telecommunications Policy in the 80's, supra note 36, reprinted in
Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 75.
39. Id.
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Although criticized for being "too general and ambiguous," 40 the report
represented the first reaction by the MPT, NTT and KDD to the increasing possibility of reformulating the existing structure of the Japanese telecommunications industry.4
In July 1982 both the MPT and NTT initially resisted a possible
privatization or division of NTT.4 2 Within two or three years, however,
both organizations supported the changes.4
In 1982 an ad hoc advisory committee44 established by the Government suggested the need to design some form of a competitive market
structure to eliminate certain deficiencies of the current monopoly. 45
Thereafter, the Japanese Government indicated an intention to adopt the
recommendation to restructure NTT. In October 1982 the MPT established a study group to address recent issues in the country's telecommunications policy. The study group concluded that the conditions which
had traditionally justified the telecommunications monopoly no longer
existed to the extent that they undermined the efficiency of the system. 46

40. Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 75.
41. Id. A major reason for the rise of such discussions in Japan was the drastic
change in United States telecommunications policy, namely the divestiture of American
Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T). See id.
42. Id. at 77. The Second Provisional Administration Investigation Committee,
headed by Mr. Toshio Doko, submitted a report to the Japanese Government. Kosugi,
supra note 3, at 3. This report recommended that NTT be privatized and that private
companies be permitted to enter the telecommunications field and directly compete with
NTT. See id. The MPT and various other groups strongly argued against these recommendations. Id.
43. Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 77.
44. The Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform was established in 1981
to investigate all government organizations and their activities in an attempt to eliminate
organizational inefficiencies. Id. at 75.

45. See id. (the report was entitled The Third Recommendation by the Provisional
Commission for Administrative Reform (July 1982)). Along with recommending the
restructure of the industry with respect to NTT, the Commission further suggested:
[1] In order to secure effective competition in the trunk circuit area, entry into new
areas such as satellite communication and new communication networks by optical
fiber cable should be permitted under certain conditions.
[2] NTT should be divided into several "regional" joint-stock companies and a
"central" joint-stock company to take over NTT's national trunk lines and research institutes. Regional monopoly is guaranteed for regional companies but monopoly is not guaranteed for the central company.
Id. at 75-76.
46. See Recent Trends, supra note 3, at 76. The first chapter of the Interim Report

by a Study Groupfor the Futureof Telecommunication Systems, entitled "Telecommunications in the Social Environment of the 21st Century," attempted to identify Japanese
social and economic situations foreseeable in the 21st Century and discussed how the
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The study group firmly supported the introduction of competition as advantageous to users and to the development of the system as a whole. As
that group reported:
In order to expand users' room for choice and construct an efficient and
sophisticated telecommunications system, further activation of telecommunication services is indispensable. To realize such a state, instead of sticking to the conventional way of management, i.e., monopolistic operation of
public telecommunication services, we should introduce competition in all
areas of telecommunication and keep the door open for the entry of multiple telecommunication enterprises. .

.

. [However, even if new enterprises

enter this market,] it is very likely that the existing telecommunication
enterprises will remain dominant over others. Therefore, it is important to
make rules to secure fair competition for the benefit of users, by securing
interconnections between different networks, by prohibiting cross
subsidy
47
within the existing entity, and by other necessary measures.
The study group cited five reasons for the shift in Japanese telecommunications policy. First, the rapid "[d]evelopment of new communication resources such as optical fiber, cable and communication satellites
[made] the theory of natural monopoly obsolete." 48 Second, the development of microelectronics solved the problem of interface between different telecommunications systems, thereby reducing the need for technical
standardization of system components. 49 Third, private enterprises with
large amounts of available capital were anxious to participate in the telecommunications market on a large-scale basis.50 Fourth, the present
management systems could not adapt to the constantly changing complexities of user information needs. 1 Last, a monopoly of the telecommunications field was inherently deficient. 2
Shortly after the study group submitted its report, the Japanese Gov-

country's present policies might be modified to better cope with these situations. Id.
47. Id. at 77.

48. Id. at 76.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 76-77.
52. Id. at 77. Monopolistic systems in areas of rapid technological advancement often
are too rigid to satisfy the industry's need for growth. Further, the enterprise which
operates the monopoly may have little incentive to satisfy public needs for enhanced services because it already maintains a capitive audience. The element of competition, however, compels operators of the systems or networks to keep abreast of technological advancement and adjust to the changing needs of the public in order to survive in the
particular industry.
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ernment decided to redraft the relevant statutes to effect this policy
change. 3 The Government revised the statutes to secure the public nature of the telecommunications industry;5 4 to develop a more sophisticated, comprehensive and reliable network upon which society could depend without fear of serious damage due to the network's failure to
operate; 5 and to introduce market competition, thereby increasing the
availability of telecommunication services while simultaneously responding to international telecommunications trends.5 6 After considerable controversy,5" the Japanese Government enacted the Electric Telecommunication Business Act (ETB Act) on December 25, 1984, representing the
58
shift in regulatory policy.
B.

The Current United States Market

The United States telecommunications market, the largest market in
the world, has also undergone significant changes over the last decade.60 The divestiture of American Telephone & Telegraph Company
(AT&T) in 198461 significantly advanced the United States' goal of creating a more open, competitive telecommunications market designed to
provide the best products and services at the lowest cost to domestic consumers. Before the break-up of the "Ma Bell" 2 monopoly, AT&T and

53. The actual decision was made in September 1983. Kosugi, supra note 3, at 4.
54. See id. In regulating a country's communications network, a government has to
preserve the system's integrity for national security and also provide maximum public
access to the network to satisfy user needs. Securing the public nature of the network
may conflict with national security considerations.
55. See Country Report, supra note 4, at 38.
56. See id. at 45; see also Kosugi, supra note 3, at 4.
57. See Berger, Politics Delays NTT Privatization, ELECTRONICS WEEK, Aug. 20,
1984, at 42.
58. Country Report, supra note 4, at 45.
59.

U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, CHANGES IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUS-

TRY AND IMPACT ON U.S. TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADE, Report to Sen. Comm. on

Finance, Investigation No. 332-172 Under Section 332 of Tariff Act of 1930, USITC
Publication 1542 (June 1984) at x [hereinafter USITC Pub. 1542]. In 1983, for example, the United States consumed $18.5 billion worth of telecommunications equipment,
33.9 percent of the total world consumption. Id. at xiii.
60. See id. at ix, 16-17.
61. Cf. id. at 17. The U.S. Department of Justice filed the antitrust suit against
AT&T in 1974. AT&T and the Department of Justice entered into an antitrust consent
decree in 1982. United States v. Western Elec. Co. (American Tel. & Tel. Co.), 552 F.
Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983).
62. AT&T can no longer use the Bell System logo because of the divestiture.
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its subsidiaries dominated all but a few areas of the telecommunications
industry. 63 AT&T dominated domestic and foreign firms by manufacturing its own equipment used in the domestic telecommunications network
and by operating the largest portions of this system. 4 Neither foreign
firms could establish a solid foothold in the United States
nor domestic
65
market.
Although the United States deregulated the telecommunications market to some extent during the late 1960s 6 and throughout the 1970s, 7
the 1984 divestiture separated the local Bell operating companies" from

63. Telecommunications equipment is usually categorized into one of the following
four types: (1) transmission equipment, the primary function of which is to forward
information from one point to another-i.e. cables or fibers; (2) switching apparatus,
which is designed to connect terminals or groups of terminals to each other; (3) customer
premises equipment (OPE), which is mainly terminal equipment such as a telephone;
and (4) cable, wire, and lightguide, which is used for transmission between apparatus not
linked by radio. United States firms, other than Western Electric, were able to compete
with Bell-supplied equipment only in the CPE category. Several FCC decisions permitted consumers to connect non-Bell equipment to the publicly switched network. For a
general outline of these decisions, see USITO Pub. 1542, supra note 59, at 17. After
1980, the FCC standard that "equipment which inherently [will] not harm the network
must be allowed to be connected or attached regardless of source" applied to CPE directly connected to the network. Id. Thus, the United States firms began mass marketing
such consumer-oriented products as telephone answering devices, telephone instruments,
and modems. See id. at 24. United States firms, however, experienced more success penetrating the market with more sophisticated CPE aimed at businesses than with consumer-type equipment. Id. at 24-25.
64. Id. at 25. AT&T maintained its dominance over domestic and foreign firms at
least until the FCC decisions on CPE. Western Electric, the principal United States
manufacturer of telecommunications equipment, had a multi-billion dollar captive market, facing virtually no competition from other manufacturers while the Bell System was
intact. Id. at 24. NTT, as AT&T did in the United States, monopolized the maintenance
and installation of telecommunications in Japan; however, NTT did not manufacture its
own equipment as AT&T did with Western Electric. Instead, NTT relied on other
manufacturers for its equipment needs. Murtha, Digital Dialing Doldrums, DATAMATION,

Dec. 15, 1985, at 48.

65. AT&T supplied telecommunications equipment to approximately 85 percent of
the active subscriber lines in the United States. See USITC Pub. 1542, supra note 59, at
ix, 24 (domestic firms), 25 (foreign firms).
66. The opening of the United States telecommunications market with respect to
CPE began in 1968 with the FCC's Carterfone decision. Id. at 17.
67. In 1971 the FCC opened direct competition in the provision of common carrier
services, thereby creating a market for transmission equipment. Finally, in 1980, the
FCC completely deregulated CPE. Id. at 17.
68. See id. The AT&T divestiture separated 22 Bell operating companies (BOCs),
such as South Central Bell, Mountain Bell, and Pacific Bell, into seven regional holding
companies wholly independent of AT&T. Id. Prior to the divestitures, BOCs were pri-

506

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 20:495

Western Electric Company, 9 and accelerated the trend toward an open
market." The divestiture resulted in immediate growth of opportunities
71
for both domestic and foreign manufacturers.
AT&T still controls the largest share of the United States market,72
but foreign and domestic competitors have been successful with respect to
certain types of consumer-oriented equipment.73 Prior to the 1984 divestiture, consumers had a limited array of telecommunications equipment
and services from which to choose. Today, however, foreign competitors
have an increased market share in the products and services traditionally
offered by the Bell system, thereby providing consumers with a greater
74
market choice.
Although deregulation of the United States telecommunications market has produced a proliferation of foreign newcomers resulting in expansion of the United States market, it has not lead to extensive reciprocal deregulation of foreign telecommunications markets.75 United States
telecommunications firms are particularly concerned about opening the
Japanese market for several reasons. First, the value of the world telecommunications products industry, currently estimated at more than $50

mary purchasers of telecommunications equipment manufactured by Western Electric.
Today, these operating companies are not required to purchase their supplies and equipment from Western Electric but are free to buy at competitive prices in the open market.

Id.
69. See supra note 64.
70.

SEN.

COMM.

ON

FINANCE,

PROMOTING

EXPANSION

OF

INTERNATIONAL

TRADE IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT AND SERVICES, AND FOR OTHER PUR-

PosES, S. REP. No. 204, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1985) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 204].
71. de Jonquieres, Era of Massive Upheavals, BURRELLE'S, Jan. 6, 1986, at 1. In

1978, fewer than 300 firms produced telecommunications equipment in the United
States; by 1983, however, this figure grew to more than 550. USITC Pub. 1542, supra
note 59, at x. But in 1978, of the less than 300 firms competing against each other, four
or less of these firms supplied 90 percent of the market. In 1983, only 10 of the more
than 550 firms supplied 90 percent of the market. See id.
72. de Jonquieres, supra note 71, at 1. AT&T and its former BOCs continue to
dominate traditional market areas. Id.; see also Guyon, And Then There Were...,
Wall St. J., Feb. 24, 1986, at 7D-8D. For example, in the long-distance industry,
AT&T captured 69.3 percent of the market's $52.3 billion worth of revenues in 1984
and an estimated 66.6 percent of $57.6 billion of revenues in 1985. The BOCs followed
with 16.9 percent in 1984 and an estimated 17.8 percent in 1985. In comparison, MCI
captured only 2.8 percent of the 1984 market and an estimated 4.7 percent in 1985. Id.
at 7D, col. 2.
73. See USITC Pub. 1542, supra note 59, at 25 (cordless telephones).
74. See id. at ix-x.

75. See Chafee Offers Bill to Halt Telecommunications Sales in U.S. UntilJapanese
Market is Opened, [2 Current Reports] INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 449 (Mar. 27, 1985).
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billion, will continue to rise-reaching a projected growth of $90 billion
77
by 1990.76 As the world's second largest telecommunications market,
the Japanese market is a fertile investment area. Japan will likely account for a substantial portion of this world growth.78 If Japan allows
full access to its telecommunications market, both foreign competitors
and Japanese consumers will benefit.7
Second, Japan will continue to capture a large share of the United
States telecommunications market by increasing its production of telecommunications equipment.8 0 In 1984 the United States imported almost
fifty percent of its telecommunications equipment from Japan."' Future
Japanese imports could satisfy the increasing consumer demand in this
country for telecommunications products, 2 especially for customer premises equipment (CPE)8s and transmission equipment."

76. S. REP. No. 204, supra note 70, at 3.
77. Id. at 4; see also supra note 59 and accompanying text.
78. See USITO Pub. 1542, supra note 59, at xx. "Loss of captive markets due to
deregulation, the mounting costs of developing new products and the accelerating cycle of
innovation are intensifying competition [among United States firms] to seek out new
markets worldwide." de Jonquieres, supra note 71, at 1.
79. A fully competitive market theoretically provides its consumers with the best
products and services available.
80. See USITO Pub. 1542, supra note 59, at xx. The United States produces nearly
one-half of the world's telecommunications products but accounts for only 13 percent of
global exports. S. REP. No. 204, supra note 70, at 3. In 1983, the United States exported $140 million of telecommunications equipment to Japan, only 4.7 percent of the
total value of equipment procured by NTT. USITO Pub. 1542, supra note 59, at 13.
Japan, on the other hand, exports over 20 percent of the world market. S. REP. No. 204,
supra note 70, at 3; see also Sethia, The Challenge of the Japanese Telecommunciations
Market 1 (Center for Telecommunciations Management, Graduate School of Business,
U.S.C. 1986). More than 50 percent of these exports are targeted at the United States
market. Sethia, supra, at 1. In 1984, Japan exported $2.3 billion worth of telecommunications equipment, $1.3 billion of it to the United States alone. Id.
81. Telecommunications Trade, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunica-

tions, Consumer Protection, and Finance and the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. 106 (1985) (Statement of Allen R. Frischkorn, Jr., on behalf of the Information
and Telecommunications Technologies Group of the Electronic Industries Association)
[hereinafter Telecommunications Trade Hearings].
82. USITO Pub. 1542, supra note 59, at xx.
83. Demand for CPE is expected to have an average annual increase of approximately 9 percent through 1993 primarily because of customer purchases of terminal
equipment such as personal computers, data display monitors and telephone sets. Id. at
xxi. Although domestically produced CPE has not been able to effectively compete with
lower priced foreign products, United States firms are expected to become more competitive with the foreign manufacturers. See id. at xx-xxi. Furthermore, consumers likely
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Third, many United States manufacturers believe their products are
superior in quality to the Japanese products."5 If Japan establishes an
open, consumer-oriented market, 6 United States firms and other foreign
manufacturers could successfully penetrate the Japanese market. This
penetration of the Japanese market would help reduce the current
United States trade deficit with Japan.
Last, exclusion from the Japanese market can inhibit the ability of
United States producers to compete on both a national and an international level. Japan is a highly advanced industrial nation. Exclusion
from the Japanese market means lost opportunities for profit which
would typically fund research and development projects for future technology." A lack of market access also results in the inability of United
States firms to keep abreast of technological advancement in Japan. 88
Further, if foreign manufacturers cannot establish a presence in the Japanese marketplace, the Japanese can concentrate on the international
arena because they do not face any competition in their domestic
market."9
From the above discussion, it is clear that the United States telecommunications policy traditionally has focused on the needs of the consumer. Japan's telecommunications policy, by contrast, has focused on
the needs of the Japanese Government. Examination of the new Japanese legislation should reveal whether the country has shifted the focus
of its telecommunication policy to be consistent with United States
policy.

will base product evaluations more upon the quality of the equipment rather than on its
price. Id. at xxi.
84. United States demand for transmission equipment should increase by more than
8 percent per year through 1993. Id. at xx.
85. See USITC Pub. 1542, supra note 59, at 26. The International Trade Commission asked domestic producers of telecommunications equipment whether they felt they
had an advantage over Japanese products. The results indicated that United States firms
felt that their products had the competitive advantage with respect to transmission and
switching equipment. Id. at 26, 186 (Table K-1.-United States producers' competitive
assessment of United States-made and Japanese-made products in the United States market), 193 (Table K-8.-United States producers' competitive assessment of United Statesmade and foreign-made products in Japanese markets).
86. Foreign firms compete best in a customer-oriented market. Id. at 25.
87. Borrus & Zysman, Industrial Development Policy in Japan, in JOINT EcoNOMICS COMM., SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMIC GOALS AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY,

99th Cong., 1st Sess. 142,
157 (Joint Com. Print 1985) [hereinafter Borrus & Zysman].
88. Id.
89. Id. at 157-58.
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OVERVIEW OF THE ELECTRIC TELECOMMUNICATION BUSINESS

ACT

A.

OF

1984

Scope of the ETB Act

By adopting the ETB Ac ° and the NTT Acte' in December 1984,
the Japanese Die 9 ostensibly liberalized Japan's telecommunications
market.9" The MPT believed that extensive governmental regulation
was no longer necessary "to ensure the construction and operation of
simple telephone services that will interconnect the entire nation." 94 The
NTT Act establishes a new corporation, Nippon Telephone and Telegraph, Ltd. (NTT)."' The Japanese Government, previously the sole
owner of NTT, will be able to sell, over time, a limited amoun 6 of
NTT stock to domestic investors. 97 The newly privatized NTT can compete in the domestic9 8 telecommunications market against other firms

90. Denki Tsiishin Jigy Ho (Electric Telecommunication Business Act, Law No.
86 of 1985 (unofficial translation) [hereinafter Electric Telecommunication Business Act
or ETB Act].
91. Nippon Denshin Denwa Kabushikigaisha H6 (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Company Act), Law No. 85 of 1984, reprinted in [Statute Vol. 1] DOING BusiNESS IN JAPAN App. 1A-40.2 (Kitigawa ed. 1986).
92. The principal law-making body of the Japanese Government is the Diet (Kokkai). The Diet is comprised of the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors. For a detailed outline of Japan's legal system, see D. HENDERSON & J. HALEY,
LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN 227-31 (1978), and H. TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 37-43 (1976).
93. Country Report, supra note 4, at 45. "The mere fact that the new law approaches its mission as providing for 'business' legislation, rather than a 'public telecommunications law' suggests the shift in emphasis contained in the new legal framework."
Id. at 49 (referring to the Electric Telecommunication Business Act).
94. Id. at 49. In fact, the ETB Act "reflects a perceived need to privatize the market
to a great degree." Id.
95. Country Report, supra note 4, at 46. Note that NTT, Ltd. is not an entirely
separate entity from the previously existing NTT (which was formed in 1952). The
NTT Act converted NTT from a public to a private corporation. Thus, the new corporation is the NTT which existed before, except that now NTT functions and is regulated
as a privately-held entity.
96. The Government can sell up to two-thirds of NTT stock. Nippon Denshin
Denwa Kabushikigaisha H-o (Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Company Act), Law
No. 85 of 1984, art. 4(2).
97. Foreign governments, corporations or persons may not hold NTT stock. Id. art.
4(1).
98. The NTT Act permits NTT to engage in only domestic telecommunications business activities. Thus, NTT and KDD effectively remain isolated from each other, with
NTT in the domestic arena and KDD providing international services. There are two
reasons why the activities of these entities were kept mutually exclusive: (1) the domestic
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and also has the authority to expand its range of services. 9 The MPT
retains substantial supervisory powers over NTT to ensure the financial
stability of the corporation and to keep its activities consistent with the
Government's telecommunications policy."' 0 The NTT Act breaks up
NTT's legal monopoly by establishing a "regulated competitive" telecommunications market.10 1 The ETB Act is of particular significance to
foreign suppliers of telecommunications equipment attempting to gain
access to the Japanese market.1 0 2 If the ETB Act does in fact open the
Japanese telecommunications market, foreign suppliers should be able to
sell much more of their equipment in Japan over the next several
03
years.
The ETB Act, which covers virtually any equipment compatible with
NTT's system,1 'O divides telecommunications services into two categories: Type I and Type II telecommunications. 10 5 The ETB Act distinguishes Type I telecommunications from Type II telecommunications
based on the "establish[ment of] telecommunications circuit facilities,"' '

market is "fundamentally" different from the international market because treaties, conventions and other international agreements affect the international market, Kosugi,
supra note 3, at 13; and (2) the Japanese Government could retain more control over
NTT and KDD to ensure that NTT would not grow too large, that NTT would not
compete directly against KDD, and that NTT and KDD could compete effectively
against newcomers in their respective markets, accord id. at 13-14.
99. See generally Kosugi, supra note 3, at 15-17 (OPE and investment opportunities
for NTT); Country Report, supra note 4, at 46-48.
100. Country Report, supra note 4, at 48.
101. Foster, Building New Barriers? The Draft Telecommunications Act, 6 E.
ASIAN EXEctrrIvE REP. 9, 9 (1984) (LEXIS, Nexus library, Bus. file).
102. See id.
103. See id. "The laws are designed to facilitate greater interconnection between
computers and transmission circuits, which will encourage the increased integration of
the information processing and telecommunications industries." Country Report, supra
note 4, at 45.
104. See Foster, supra note 101, at 9. The ETC Act defines "telecommunications"
as "transmitting, conveying or receiving codes, sounds or images by wire, radio or any
other electromagnetic method." Electric Telecommunication Business Act, art. 2(i). The
ETB Act further defines "telecommunications facilities" as "machines, apparatuses,
wires and cables or any other electrical facilities for the operation of telecommunications." Id. art. 2(ii).
105. Electric Telecommunication Business Act, art. 6(1).
106. Id. art. 6(2). The ETB Act provides:
Type I telecommunications business shall be that business which provides telecommunications service by establishing telecommunications circuit facilities (which
means transmission line facilities connecting transmitting points with receiving
points, switching facilities installed as inseparable units therefrom, and other facilities accessory to such facilities, the same shall apply hereinafter).
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the basic network infrastructure necessary to provide essential telecommunications services."' Thus, Type I telecommunications businesses
provide services very similar to those presently provided by NTT.'0 8 A
Type I business generally includes any telecommunications business that
owns transmission equipment or facilities."' 9 A Type II business leases
these basic facilities."' Installation of Type I facilities consequently requires a huge investment of capital."1 Since a Type I business resembles
a public welfare industry such as an electric or gas company,11 2 the ETB
Act requires any person who intends to operate a Type I business to
obtain permission from the MPT to conduct the business.1 3 By requiring MPT approval, the ETB Act ensures that Type I operators have the
financial stability to continue providing the proposed services on a long
term basis.1 1 4
Establishing a Type I operation requires a substantial investment and
involves direct competition with the established NTT network. Private
companies, however, may penetrate the Japanese market if they tailor

Id.
107. Kosugi, supra note 3, at 5.
108. See supra note 31.
109. Country Report, supra note 4, at 54.
110. Id.
111. Kosugi, supra note 3, at 5-6. Operating a Type I business requires installing
cable or microwave network or telecommunications satellites.
112. Electric Telecommunication Business Act, art. 9(1).
113. See Kosugi, supra note 3, at 6. A Type I operator can only provide services in
geographical areas where it has installed the necessary equipment. Id. If an operator
somehow becomes incapable of maintaining equipment in a particular sector, it deprives
users of services. See id.
114. See id. Article 10 of the ETB Act provides:
The Minister of Posts and Telecommunications shall grant permission [for the
operation of a Type I business to a person] . . . if [the MPT] determines that an
application for permission [under article 9 of the Act] conforms to each of the
following items:
i) Telecommunications service to be provided by a telecommunications carrier
shall be appropriate in the light of the demand in the service territory.
ii) The introduction of the telecommunications business shall not result in a significant excess of telecommunications circuit facilities to be used for such business in
all or in any part of the territory or route to be covered by the telecommunications
carrier.
iii) The applicant shall have an adequate financial basis and technical capability
to properly perform his or her telecommunications business.
iv) The plan of the telecommunications business shall be reliable and feasible.
v) In addition, the introduction of the telecommunications business shall be appropriate for the sound development of telecommunications in general.
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their services to areas with expansion potential."' 0 Concentration of
Type I businesses in areas characterized by high user demand and on
new technologies, such as value-added networks (VANs),116 fiber optics
and satellites, 117 could prove most profitable.
The ETB Act expressly prohibits a foreign entity from completely
owning a Type I operation."' Article 11 of the ETB Act provides that
the MPT shall not grant permission to establish a Type I carrier if a
foreign government, corporation or organization directly or indirectly
controls one-third or more of the applicant.1 Although article 11 may
be characterized as a measure to preserve national security, Japan obviously intends to insulate the NTT and KDD networks from foreign
competitors capable of thriving in the Japanese market. Regardless of its
policy basis, article 11 will restrict any growth in Type I telecommunication services to predominately domestic entities.
Type II businesses provide various telecommunications services
through a transmission network installed by a Type I business.12 0 Type
II services include VAN, telephone and facsimile services. 2 The ETB
Act further divides Type II services into two subcategories on a quanti-

115. See Kosugi, supra note 3, at 7.
116. A value-added network (VAN) basically consists of a main computer at a central location, digital switches and transmission equipment to route the data to remote
locations, and software to implement the system. VANs are used to provide information
in business transactions. For example, a bank may use a VAN to transfer funds to one or
more of its major customers. VANs transfer information regarding a credit card holder's
available credit and the value of an item purchased by the cardholder between the credit
card information center and the store location. VANs also link home computers to central
databases providing all types of information. Innovative VANs obviously reduce operating costs for almost any business.
117. Kosugi, supra note 3, at 7.
118. Electric Telecommunication Business Act, art. 11(iv)-(vi). At least six applicants have sought MPT approval for Type I services primarily for the operation of
satellite-based networks or territorial facilities. Daini Denden, the largest potential competitor, plans to install a microwave network. This is a joint venture composed almost
completely of Japanese manufacturers, banks and trading companies. Nihon Telecom,
formed by Japan National Railways, plans to operate a fiber optic network. Teleway
Japan also plans to operate a fiber optic network. Ford Aerospace has agreed with Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsubishi Electric Company to initiate a satellite operation
using Ford's satellites. The other applicants, all joint ventures, include Japan Communications Satellite Company and Satellite Japan Corporation. See generally Country Report, supra note 4, at 50-52.
119. Electric Telecommunication Business Act, art. 11(vii).
120. Kosugi, supra note 3, at 8; see Country Report, supra note 4, at 54.
121. Kosugi, supra note 3, at 8.
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tative basis: General and Special Type II telecommunications. 2 2 Special
Type II businesses provide facilities that exceed a certain capacity1 2 s to
"many and unspecific persons."' 124 Because most new competitors will
not have equipment exceeding the capacity limitation imposed by the
MPT ordinance, the distinction between General and Specific Type II
turns on the definition of "many and unspecific persons" under the ETB
5
Act.

12

The MPT requires businesses to satisfy the following criteria in order
to meet the "many and unspecific persons" requirement necessary for
classification as a Special Type II business: (1) the conditions of the business' tariffs are made public; (2) there is no variation among customers
for services or rates; (3) the business must serve all users who request
such service; and (4) users can access the service through the public telephone network.126 Thus, a business ordinarily can avoid a Special Type
II classification by leaving its rates open to negotiation on an individual
basis1 27 or by limiting its services to only a select group of users who
1 28
request the service.

The distinction between General and Special Type II business is important to foreign competitors. While the MPT does not restrictively
regulate entry into the Japanese market by a General Type II business,1 29 it must approve any entry of a Special Type II business. 30 The

122. Electric Telecommunication Business Act, art. 21(1)-(3).
123. The MPT ordinance classifies a company which has 500 or more lines (calculated by 1,200 bits per second) as a Special Type II business; a company that has equipment with less capacity is considered a General Type II business. Kosugi, supra note 3,
at 8. Originally, potential competitors thought the ordinance would base the General/
Specific distinction on services to 500 users. Country Report, supra note 4, at 56.
124. Electric Telecommunication Business Act, art. 21(3).
125. Cf.Country Report, supra note 4, at 56-57.
[T]he Ministry does not take subscriber lines into account in calculating the size of
a business; only trunk lines (leased by the carrier) are counted. Since each carrier
line can provide service to many users through connections to a local switch, a
service with 500 access lines will be able to reach thousands of end users. Thus,
this limit also poses little practical restriction on the size of a General Type II
business.

Id.
126. Id. at 55-56.
127. Id. at 56. Negotiable rates would not satisfy the MPT's second criteria.
128. Id. Selective services would fail the MPT's third criteria.
129. Electric Telecommunication Business Act, art. 22. Foreign firms wishing to
provide General Type II services must file a notification with the MPT of their plans to
provide the services along with their names and addresses and a description of the services. Id. art. 22(1)(i)-(ii).
130. Id. art 24. Under the registration system, a foreign firm must submit, in addi-
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ETB Act provides grounds upon which the MPT can refuse registration
of a Special Type II business,1"' but the ETB Act is silent with respect
to the MPT's authority to refuse a notification application from a General Type II business.1" 2 Three experts stated that "[iln view of the regulatory requirements imposed on Special Type II businesses-and the
ease of avoiding Special Type II classification-it is unclear why anyone
would seek to register as a Special Type II business. 1 33 General Type
II businesses ultimately will provide telecommunication services to distinctive groups of users with common capital or trade interests, such as a
parent company and its subsidiaries.'" Special Type II businesses, by
contrast, will lease massive national or international networks to provide
services for as many customers as possible.13 5 As with its treatment of
Type I services, Japan took precautions in the ETB Act to protect
NTT's traditional services from the larger, more threatening, and potentially lucrative businesses.
B. MPT Authority under the ETB Act
The Electric Telecommunication Business Act effectively places the
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications in direct control of all aspects
of Japan's telecommunications business.1 3 The new law imposes only
vague limitations on the MPT's discretionary power, thus rendering the
MPT a powerful regulatory body in today's global telecommunications
37
affairs.1
The MPT's authority covers both administrative and economic aspects
of Japan's telecommunications industry. First, the MPT decides who
may compete in Japan's telecommunications market.1 8" Second, the

tion to the same information required of General Type II businesses, an outline of its
telecommunications facilities and a business plan. Id. arts. 24(2)(iii), 24(3).
131. Refusal of Special Type II registration is governed by id. art. 16.
132. There is no code section comparable to article 26 with respect to MPT refusal
of notification for General Type II businesses.
133. Country Report, supranote 4, at 56.
134. See Kosugi, supra note 3, at 7-8. Other hypothetical situations include manufacturer-wholesaler relationships and groups of chain stores engaged in the same or similar businesses.
135. See id. at 8.
136. Foster, supra note 101, at 9.
137. Id. Foster views the ETB Act as creating an opportunity for the MPT to enhance its bureaucratic influence in both Japan and the international telecommunications
arena.
138. See generally Electric Telecommunication Business Act, arts. 2, 6, 9-30, 94.
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MPT also determines what services are necessary and available."' 9
Third, the MPT controls the agencies that test and certify all equipment
entering the Japanese market.1 40 The MPT's discretion is most apparent
with respect to Type I telecommunications. Under article 10 of the ETB
Act, the MPT may exert a broad ambit of discretion in deciding whether
to permit an applicant to conduct a proposed Type I service. The MPT
must grant permission if it finds that the proposed operation: (1) appropriately meets the demands of users in the particular service area, 41 (2)
will not result in a "significant excess" of circuit facilities in the particular service territory or route, 142 (3) is reliable and feasible, particularly
with respect to the applicant's financial and technical capability to properly provide the service,1 43 and (4) is "appropriate for the sound development of telecommunications in general. 144 The Ministry of Posts and
Telecommunications therefore controls Japan's facilities market by determining which and how many operators of a Type I business may
compete against NTT. 45 The language of article 10 provides the Ministr with ample justifications for any governmental telecommunications
policy. Although the MPT has not exercised its broad discretionary authority to the detriment of foreign firms, it retains powers under article
10 to counter retaliation by foreign countries to further open the Japa146
nese market.
Fourth, the MPT also has extensive control of the business activities
of Type I and Special Type Ii businesses. The Ministry may at its own
discretion determine the period within which a Type I carrier must commence offering a particular service to its users. 4" If a Type I carrier or a
Special Type II business modifies the services or equipment it offers, or
the geographic service area in the case of a Type I carrier, it must immediately notify the MPT of such changes for prior approval.1 4 Further,
the MPT closely regulates all transfers, mergers, assignments or takeovers of Type I businesses. Thus, if a Type I business wants to entrust
part of its activities to another person, the MPT must first approve the

139. Foster, supra note 101, at 9; see Electric Telecommunication Business Act, arts.
68-72; infra notes 165-220 and accompanying text.
140. See generally Electric Telecommunication Business Act, arts. 2, 6, 9-30, 94.
141. Id. art. 10(i).
142. Id. art. 10(ii).
143. See id. art. 10(iii)-(iv).
144. Id. art. 10(v).
145. See Country Report, supra note 4, at 61.
146. See, e.g., infra notes 263-354 and accompanying text.
147. Electric Telecommunication Business Act, art. 12(2).
148. Id. arts. 14, 27.
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transfer.1 49 The MPT also controls the setting of rates or tariffs for customers of Type I businesses by requiring them to submit an outline of
rates and services to the MPT for prior approval. 150 Although there is
no requirement that the MPT approve rates for General or Special
Type II services, a Special Type II business must notify the MPT of the
rates before enforcing them. 1
The ETB Act further empowers the MPT to regulate contractual relations between either foreign or domestic businesses. For example, the
Ministry must approve any agreement or amendment between two Type
I carriers to interconnect or share their facilities.1 52 Furthermore, the
MPT can order Type I businesses to share or interconnect their equipment upon determining that such interaction is necessary or appropriate
to further the public interest. 53
Last, the MPT controls all interaction between Type I and Special
Type II carrier businesses and foreign persons or governments by requiring prior authorization to enter into telecommunications-related
agreements or contracts.'" This provision clearly applies to agreements
between foreign-owned Japanese subsidiaries and the foreign parent
company, but it is not clear whether the MPT can require prior approval of contracts entered into in Japan between a Japanese entity and
a foreign company doing business in Japan through one of its Japanese
branches.' 55
The ETB Act ostensibly grants broad regulatory authority to the
MPT; however, this authority provides the MPT with the capability to
assume an interventionist rather than a regulatory role regarding the future structures and development of Japan's telecommunications networks. The ETB Act fails to provide for a truly impartial regulatory
body; therefore, the MPT may favor domestic firms over foreign competitors, particularly if the foreign competitors are unable to exert external
pressure on the Japanese Government.
IV.

IssuEs RAISED BY THE JAPANESE LEGISLATION

Japan's enactment of the Electric Telecommunication Business Act of
1985 raised several concerns regarding United States access to the Japa-

149. See id. arts. 15-16.
150. Id. art. 31.
151. See id. art. 31(5)-(6).
152. Id. art. 38.
153. Id. art. 39(1).
154. Id. art. 40.
155. Foster, supra note 101, at 9.
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nese telecommunications market and, on a larger scale, the future direction of United States-Japan trade relations.15 The United States challenged the drafting procedures of the Japanese telecommunications
equipment certification standards and approval authority, the foreign
representation on Japanese advisory councils, and the trade deficit with
Japan. United States and Japanese officials commenced high-level talks
1 58
("M.O.S.S.") 157 in January 1985 in an effort to resolve the issues.
While the parties temporarily resolved some of the issues, others still
threaten the ETB Act's effectiveness in opening the Japanese
telecommunications markets.
A.

Primary Objectives of the United States in Resolving the Issues

The United States set forth the major criteria for a successful resolution of the issues raised by the new Japanese telecommunications
1 59
laws:
(1) Elimination of the discretionary authority of officials who will implement the system for regulating telecommunication services and equipment.
(2) Limitation of technical standards and requirements to those necessary
for protection against harm to the network.
(3) Guarantee against discrimination between foreign and domestic
suppliers.
(4) Assurance of the transparency, integrity and independence of procedures for registration of telecommunications services, equipment approval
and appeals.16 0
United States trade officials, skeptical that any significant developments would result from the negotiations, were anxious to reach an
156. See U.S., Japan Open Trade Talks with Focus on Telecommunications, Car
VRA Tie-In Seen, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 173 (Jan. 30, 1985).
The trade deficit with Japan may have exaggerated the problems foreseen by the United
States concerning the new access to the Japanese telecommunications market; nevertheless, achieving full market access remains "one of the most challenging international
trade problems facing the United States today." Chaffee Offers Bill to Halt Telecommu-

nication Sales in U.S. Until Japanese Market is Opened, [2 Current Reports] Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 449 (Mar. 27, 1985) (comment by William Moore, chairman of
American Electronics Association).
157. Market-Oriented Sector-Selective.

158.

U.S., Japan Open Trade Talks with Focus on Telecommunications, Car VRA

Tie-In Seen, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 173 (Jan. 30, 1985).
159. Kosugi, supra note 3, at 21-23. Deputy United States Trade Representative
Michael B. Smith turned this list of criteria over to the Japanese Government on March
13, 1985.
160. Id. at 22-23.
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agreement before the Japanese law became effective on April 1, 1985.61
The Japanese Foreign Ministry, on the other hand, did not exhibit the
same sense of urgency.16 2 One United States official"'S stated that if Japan did not modify its current policy, particularly with respect to the
MPT regulations"" covering the implementation of the ETB Act, "a
system [would] be put in place beginning on April 1, 1985, which seriously disadvantages foreign suppliers, does an injustice to Japanese consumers and lends fuel to an international perception that, despite political statements to the contrary, Japan remains committed to keeping its
market essentially protected from foreign competition." 6 5
B.

Major Telecommunications Issues Between the United States and
Japan
1. Foreign Representation on Japanese Advisory Councils

The Electric Telecommunication Business Act provides that the MPT
may establish a designated approval agency (DAA) to test the technical
standards of services and equipment entering the Japanese market. a"6
The ETB Act requires the MPT to consult with the appropriate Japanese advisory council prior to making "major" telecommunications policy

161. See U.S., Japan Open Trade Talks with Focus on Telecommunications, Car
VRA Tie-In Seen, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 173 (Jan. 30, 1985).
162. See U.S. May Retaliate IfJapan Denies Access to TelecommunicationsMarket,
Officials Say, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 225 (Feb. 13, 1985) (John

Stern, the American Electronics Association's senior representative in Japan, stated that
the Japanese position, specifically that of the MPT, was not "very understanding" of
United States concerns).
163. Undersecretary of Commerce Lionel H. Olmer.
164. The ETB Act refers to ordinances and regulations which the Japanese Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications was to promulgate before the law took effect on
April 1, 1985. E.g., Electric Telecommunication Business Act, arts. 49-52; see infra note
193 and accompanying text. United States officials expected that the regulations would
determine to what extent Japan intended to open its telecommunications market to foreign competitors.
165. Letter from Undersecretary of Commerce Lionel Olmer to Japanese Vice Minister Moriya Koyama (Mar. 5, 1985), reprintedin [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 400 (Mar. 13, 1985) [hereinafter Olmer Letter].
166. Electric Telecommunication Business Act, art. 68(1). For example, the DAA
approves all CPE for attachment to all networks. It also approves any equipment provided or sold by a Type I operator. Kosugi, supra note 3, at 28. Once the Ministry
choses a DAA to conduct the approval process, it relinquishes all authority to conduct
the process on its own. Electric Telecommunication Business Act, art. 68(3).
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decisions, 16 7 such as amending MPT technical standards ordinances,1 68
permitting a Type I operator to enter the country,189 or modifying criteria for classification of telecommunication services.' The Ministry must
defer to council recommendations when undertaking any major administrative action.17 1 The Ministry conceivably could avoid this requirement
by labelling a particular decision as "minor.'1 7 2 However, the appropri-

ate advisory council must confirm the MPT's characterization of a decision as "minor," 17' and it thus remains uncertain whether the MPT can
develop major telecommunications policy under a "minor decision"
pretense.
The ETB Act contains no language prescribing the membership of
Japanese telecommunications advisory councils.1 7 4 Potential foreign competitors worried that council members who were representatives of directly interested parties might discriminate against them.'7 Further-

167. Electric Telecommunication Business Act, art. 94. This article provides:
The Minister of Posts and Telecommunications shall, where he intends to make
administrative dispositions etc. set forth below, consult the council stipulated in the
applicable cabinet ordinance (in this Article referred to as "the council") and make
such administrative dispositions etc. in deference to its decisions. This shall not
apply, however, to such matters as the council deems to be minor.
i) Permission for Type I telecommunications business under the provisions of Article 9 paragraph (1).
ii) Permission for changes in category of telecommunications service etc. of a Type
I telecommunications carrier under the provisions of Article 14 paragraph (1).
iii) Proposal for the establishment, amendment or abolition of the applicable cabinet ordinance under the provisions of Article 21 paragraph (3).
iv) Authorization with respect to tariffs of a Type 1 telcommunications carrier
under the provisions of Article 21, paragraph (3).
iv) (sic) Establishment, amendment or abolition of the applicable ordinance of the
Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications with respect to the technical standards
under the provisions of Article 41 paragraph (1), Article 49 paragraph (1) or
Article 52 paragraph (1) item (i).
168. Id. art. 94(iv).
169. Id. art. 94(i).
170. See id. art. 94(ii)-(iii).
171. Id. art. 94.
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. Foster, supra note 101, at 9.
175. Accord SEN. COMM. ON FINANCE, REQUIRING THE PRESIDENT TO RESPOND
TO UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES OF JAPAN, S. REP. No. 102, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 6
(1985) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 1021; Ahearn, Market Access in Japan: The U.S. Expe-

rience, in JOINT

ECONOMIC COMM., SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMIC GOALS AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL POLICY, JAPAN'S ECONOMY AND TRADE WITH THE UNITED STATES, 99th

Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (Joint Comm. Print 1985); Administration, Congress Starting to
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more, Japan frequently drafts technical standards and regulations by
drawing on the advice of domestic industries having an interest in excluding foreign competition. 176 This practice leaves United States export177
ers with little or no voice in the technical standards drafting process
and allows the appropriate regulatory body to skew regulation in favor
of domestic industries.1 7 8 Foreign representation on the Japanese telecommunications advisory councils can be critical in defining the scope of
products and services entering the Japanese market.
The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (GATT Standards
Code) 17 9 requires Japan to provide the United States and other interested governments with an opportunity to comment upon the proposed
technical standards and regulations.'8 This formal commentary period
ensures a minimum level of input into the drafting process at the advisory stage. In practice, however, Japan ignored the GATT Standards
Code. Although Japan promised a nine-week commentary period, it gave
the United States a mere sixteen days to examine the standards and ordi-

nances.'8 Despite the GATT Standards Code, Japan effectively denied
the United States any meaningful opportunity to provide valuable input
into the drafting process.
In 1985 the United States reminded Japan that it had agreed to in-

Weigh Retaliatory Measures as Trade Talks Stall, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 374 (Mar. 13, 1985); Foster, supra note 101, at 9. Japan decided to compose the
DAA of members of NTT, KDD and the Communications Industry Association of Japan (IAJ); no foreign members sat on the board of directors. Ahearn, supra, at 51.
176. S. REP. No. 102, supra note 175, at 6; see also Ahearn, supra note 175, at 5051.
177. S. REP. No. 102, supra note 175, at 6.
178. Ahearn, supra note 175, at 51.
179. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 12, 1979, 31 U.S.T. 405,
T.I.A.S. No. 9616,

_,

U.N.T.S.

(forthcoming).

180. Id. art. 2.5, 31 U.S.T. at 415, T.I.A.S. No. 9616, at 3,
U.N.T.S.
(forthcoming).
181. S. REP. No. 102, supra note 175, at 6; see, e.g., Regulations Concerning Terminal Facilities, Etc. (Ministerial Ordinance No. 31 of 1985). The Japanese Government agreed in 1983 to provide foreigners nine weeks to comment on draft regulations,
thereby increasing the 16 day obligation under the GATT Standards Code. REPORT OF
THE LIAISON HEADQUARTERS ON STANDARDS

AND CERTIFICATION

(commonly re-

ferred to as the "Gotoda Report").
The MPT notified the GATT Secretariat of the draft regulations nine weeks in advance of the final date for offical comment, but the MPT did not make actual copies of
the draft regulations available until 16 days before this deadline. Abelson, M.O.S.S.
Telecommunications: (Draft) Final Report 12 (Office of the United States Trade Representative 1986). This particular problem subsequently was corrected with respect to
other regulations drafted by the MPT. Id.
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clude foreign representatives on all administrative or advisory committees
which develop policy and draft standards in the high-tech field."l 2
United States officials urged that the Japanese Government select Japanese nationals working for foreign-affiliated telecommunications companies to serve on telecommunications advisory councils and that this selection process be based upon the individual's work, knowledge and
experience in the telecommunications field.1 8"
The Japanese acceded to the United States pressure and agreed to
restructure the selection process for membership on the most crucial telecommunications advisory body: the Japanese Approval Institute for
Telecommunications (JATE).&I Prior to the enactment of the Electric
Telecommunication Business Act, the Japanese selected JATE as the
DAA but remained silent about JATE's existence or purpose.18 5 The
original board of directors for JATE included representatives of parties
directly interested in the role of the DAA.1 8 The MPT guaranteed the
independence of JATE from interested parties. 1 7 Members who represented directly interested parties, such as telecommunications carriers
and equipment manufacturers, had to resign their positions on the committee.""8 JATE nevertheless remains only a quasi-independent body. 8 ,
Although more neutral individuals replaced some of JATE's former
merAbers, the agency continues to be funded by private endowments, 1 0
thus allowing powerful Japanese telecommunications firms to influence
JATE decisions. Further, former NTT employees still serve as examiners of equipment for JATE.19 1

182. See Olmer Letter, supra note 165, at 401 (referring to the U.S.-Japan High
Technology Agreement of 1983).
183. Id.
184. AdministrationApplauds News Agreement on TelecommunicationsAccess with
Japanese, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 474, 475 (Apr. 3, 1985). In
1984, Japan established JATE specifically in anticipation of NTT's privatization. Abelson, supra note 181, at 2. NTT and KDD, Japanese banks, and four Japanese companies of the telecommunications "family"-Nippon Electric (NEC), Oki, Hitachi and
Fujitsu-contributed $600,000 to help found JATE. Id.
185. See Abelson, supra note 181, at 2.
186. Id. For example, NEC, Oki, Hitachi and Fujitsu each loaned an application
examiner to JATE. Although these examiners were no longer with JATE after June
1985, former NTT employees still served as examiners for JATE. Id. at 2-3.
187. Kosugi, supra note 3, at 27.
188. Id.
189. AdministrationApplauds News Agreement on Telecommunications Access with
Japanese, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 474, 475 (April 3, 1985).
190. Kosugi, supra note 3, at 28.
191. Supra note 186.
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The effects of foreign representation on the Japanese telecommunications advisory councils, particularly JATE, remain unclear. Although
Japan agrees to limited foreign representation on MPT's primary resource for policy decisionmaking and technical standards councils, they
have not yet specified how many and under what process representatives
of foreign competitors will be selected or the possible benefits for United
States competitors." 2
2.

Japanese Standards for Certification and Approval of Equipment
and Services

The product-testing certification and approval procedures that Japan
originally adopted 93 were the most controversial aspect of the Electric
Telecommunication Business Act. The United States objected vigorously
to both the registration and notification requirements for firms wishing
to enter the Japanese telecommunications market 9 4 and the certification
standards for equipment manufactured by these firms.19 5 In addition to
concerns about the partiality of several key Japanese councils, United
States officials termed the Japanese registration scheme "cumbersome
and discriminatory" 9 by requiring potential submission of confidential
business information197 and labelled the equipment approval system a
192. See Administration Applauds News Agreement on Telecommunications Access
with Japanese, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 475 (Apr. 3, 1985).
193. See Regulations Concerning Terminal Facilities, Etc. (Ministerial Ordinance
No. 31 of 1985). Japan originally did not adopt the FCC "harm to the network" standard, supra note 63, as a basis for the MPT's standards. Abelson, supra note 181, at 7.
The Electric Telecommunication Business Act set forth this following criteria as the basis for the certification and approval standards:
(i) The telecommunications circuit facilities [to which the equipment is be connected] shall not be damaged or impaired, nor shall functions thereof be impaired.
(ii) Any nuisance shall not be caused to other users of the telecommunications
circuit facilities.
(iii) The demarcation of responsibility between the telecommunications circuit facilities established by a Type I telecommunications carrier and terminal facilities
connected to them by a user shall be clearly stipulated.
Electric Telecommunication Business Act, art. 49(2)(i)-(iii). Although article 49 specifically applies to standards for connections of terminal facilities, these criteria basically
apply to all other equipment which may be used in the telecommunications network. See
id., art. 52.
194. U.S., JapanMake Some Headway in Negotiations on Telecommunications, But
No Final Deal Yet, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 408 (Mar. 20, 1985).
195. Id.
196. Schwartz, Hits Japan's New Telecom Policy as Biased, ELECTRONIC NEWS,
Mar. 18, 1985, at 58 (referring to statements by Lionel Olmer).
197. Id.; see Olmer Letter, supra note 165, at 401.
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"maze of approving authorities." '
The regulations presented several entry barriers to foreign firms.
First, the MPT may not accept United States test data for certification
in Japan.1 9 In the United States, Japanese firms can self-certify telecommunications equipment entering the market according to the FCC
"harm to the network" standard.20 0 Apart from this relatively low certification threshold, the FCC minimizes the discretionary authority of
United States personnel in the certification standards process.20 1 Market
forces primarily control the range of services and products entering the
United States. 202 In Japan, technical standards, not Japanese consumer
demands, determine what types of equipment enter the Japanese
20 3
market.
A second barrier to foreign entry in the Japanese market was dockside
inspections of telecommunications equipment . 2a0 Critics argued that "Japan's restrictive standards and approval procedures [had] the effect of
either [(1)] excluding foreign products from the market because of the
prohibitive cost of establishing that the product meets the requirements. . . or [(2)] delaying their entry, often long enough to allow Japanese manufacturers to introduce a competitive product. '2 0 5
United States officials further advocated the establishment by Japan of
a sole approval agency with certification standards comparable, if not
identical, to the standards imposed by the United States on the same
products and services offered in its market by foreign firms.20 6 The
United States maintained that this independent approval agency should
not be closely connected to NTT, or NTT would, in effect, be capable of
certifying its own equipment.20 7 Japan has a legitimate interest in preserving, to some degree, individual technical standards to safeguard the
operation of the country's entire telecommunications system. 08 It is in198. Olmer Letter, supra note 165, at 401.
199. Murtha, supra note 64, at 52.
200. Schwartz, supra note 196, at 58. See supra note 63.
201. Schwartz, supra note 196, at 58.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Murtha, supra note 64, at 52.
205. S. REP. No. 102, supra note 175, at 6.
206. Olmer Letter, supra note 165, at 401. The United States essentially proposed to
simplify the Japanese procedures to allow the swiftest market access to foreign firms.
The United States also suggested that there be an appeals channel for foreign competitors to challenge decisions by the MPT and that there be periodic review by the MPT of
established procedures.
207. See id. Before the ETB Act, NTT approved all of its own equipment.
208. See USITC Pub. 1542, supra note 59, at 12-13.
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appropriate, however, to purposefully develop unique and complicated
standards to discourage competitive imports.20 0 United States officials
and telecommunications firms obviously felt, given the growing interdependence of telecommunications markets, that Japan carried its legitimate interest too far.
Intense negotiations'" 0 between MPT officials and United States delegates led to an agreement to ease market entry for foreign products by
reducing the number of certification standards from fifty-three to
twenty.2 11 The Ministry agreed to delete certain requirements that duplicated testing procedures already taken by most foreign competitors,
such as speech-quality tests for voice-transmission equipment.2 12
The most important outcome of these negotiations was an agreement
by the MPT to accept foreign manufacturer test data,21 3 an approach
similar to the FCC's streamlined certification system. 4 Imported equipment is document-checked, 2 1 but the MPT (through the DAA or
JATE) retains the authority to test the equipment more thoroughly
when unsatisfied with the document checks.21 6 United States exporters,

209. See id.
210. See Administration, Congress Starting to Weigh Retaliatory Measures as
Trade Talks Stall, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 374 (Mar. 13, 1985);
Berger, U.S. Makes Progress in Japan Telecom Talks, ELECTRONICS WEEK, Apr. 29,
1985, at 24 [hereinafter U.S. Makes Progress].
211. See U.S. Makes Progress, supra note 210, at 24. Japan initially reduced the
number of standards to 30, Telecommunications Talks Resume Next Week, NTT Accord
Consultations Also to Start Then, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 507
(Apr. 10, 1985), but further reduced this amount to 20. Latest Move to Open Telecommunications Market Praised by U.S., Other Talks Resume, [2 Current Reports] Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 564, 565 (Apr. 24, 1985).
212. U.S. Makes Progress,supra note 210, at 24; see Dentzer & Dahlby, Getting a
Foot in Japan'sDoor, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 25, 1985, at 74. For example, Japan eliminated the requirement that all phones make the same buzzing sound to indicate to a
caller that the telephone at the other end of the line is ringing. Latest Move to Open
TelecommunicationsMarket Praisedby U.S., Other Talks Resume, [2 Current Reports]
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 564, 565 (Apr. 24, 1985). Japan also eliminated voice-quality
requirements for signal-power-level tests and acoustic-coupler standards. U.S. Makes
Progress, supra note 210, at 24.
213. See U.S. Makes Progress, supra note 210, at 24.
214. See Latest Move to Open Telecommunications Market Praised by U.S., Other
Talks Resume, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 564, 565 (Apr. 24, 1985);
see also New Telecommunications Certification Plan Said to Allow Better U.S. Access
To Market, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 781, 783 (June 12, 1985).
215. U.S. Makes Progress, supra note 210, at 24.
216. Id.; see New Telecommunications CertificationPlan Said to Allow Better U.S.
Access to Market, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 781, 783 (June 12,
1985). The FCC reserves a similar right to further inspect equipment offered in the
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now able to self-certify their products with documents, 1 appeared to
have technical parity with other competitors in the Japanese telecommunications market.218 However, one United States official21 9 warned that
although the MPT significantly modified its certification system and
would codify the amended standards to achieve impartiality, United
States manufacturers should wait and see how the Ministry manipulated
the entire Japanese telecommunications market before assessing the competitiveness of foreign products. 2 °
3. The Telecommunications Trade Deficit with Japan
One of the most difficult issues facing the United States today is how
to solve the huge trade deficit with Japan.221 In 1986 the total trade
deficit with Japan was approximately $59 billion. 2 With respect to
telecommunications, the 1986 trade deficit with Japan exceeded $2 billion. 22 ' Although the United States appears to have increased dramatiUnited States. U.S. Makes Progress,supra note 210, at 24.

217. Robertson, Commerce: Japan Backs Down on Some Telecom Bars, ELECTRONIC NEWS, Mar. 25, 1985, at 6.

218. New Telecommunications Certification Plan Said to Allow Better U.S. Access
to Market, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 781, 782 (June 12, 1985). "No
American manufacturer should have difficulty complying with the Japanese standards as
they have been revised. We have achieved reciprocity of market on a technical level."
U.S. Makes Progress, supra note 210, at 24 (statement by John T. McDonnell, Jr.,
group vice president for the Electronics Industries Association). This is particularly true
because JATE, like the FCC, is the single body which approves all terminal equipment.
NTT and the MPT, however, still establish the technical requirements subject to JATE

approval. See New Telecommunications Certification Plan Said to Allow Better U.S.
Access to Market, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 781, 782 (June 12,
1985).
219. Donald S. Abelson, Director of Technical Trade Barriers, Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative.

220. U.S. Makes Progress, supra note 210, at 25.
221. The bilateral trade balance between 1975 and 1977 averaged $5 billion in Japan's favor. From 1978 through 1980, this figure increased to an average of $10 billion.
The trade deficit with Japan further increased from 1981 to 1983 to an average of $17
billion. Ahearn, supra note 175, at 44.

222.

1986 Deficit Hits Record $153 Billion Even Though December Figures

Showed Improvement, [4 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 125 (Feb. 4, 1987).
In 1984, the trade deficit with Japan equalled $37 billion. Trade Balance Information
Sheet, United States Trade Representative Office. The trade deficit with Japan climbed

to $50 billion in 1985. U.S., Japanese Officials Disagreeon Cause of Trade Imbalance
But Not on Its Effects, [3 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1291 (Oct. 22,
1986).
223. USTR Official Warns of Trade RetaliationAgainst West Germany in Telecommunications, [4 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 313 (Mar. 4, 1987). In 1984,
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cally its exportation of telecommunications equipment by more than seventy-nine percent from 1978 to 1983, these exports actually accounted
for less than four percent of the total foreign consumption of telecommunications products for the same period.224 Moreover, the share of the
domestic market held by United States producers decreased by almost
2 25
eight percent during this period.
The United States telecommunications industry incurred its first trade
deficit in over ten years in 1983 as a result of FCC actions in the 1960s
and 1970s and the expected divestiture of AT&T in 1984.22 Although
United States telecommunications exports to the Middle East and developing countries grew significantly, the drastic increase in United States
telecommunications imports from technologically advanced nations such
as Japan negated the impact of the growth in exports to these countries.227 By 1983, Japan exported 18.7 times as much telecommunications equipment to the United States as the United States exported to
Japan.22 One major reason for the disparity in trade between the
United States and these advanced countries, particularly Japan, is that
most foreign markets which have their own indigenous equipment man-

the telecommunications trade deficit with Japan approached $1.9 billion, doubling the
$960 million deficit with the country in 1982. Telecommunications Trade Hearings,
supra note 81, at 1 (statement of Rep. Timothy E. Wirth, Chairman of Subcomm. on
Telecommunications, Consumer Protection, and Finance). The overall telecommunications deficit in 1984 was only $608 million, id. at 2, so it is obvious that the lack of
market access in Japan is the major reason for this deficit. Note that the trade figures
used may not be consistent with other sources because of the varying definition or scope
of "telecommunications equipment." Compare id. at 10 (statement of Robert S. Strauss)
(telecommunications trade deficit of $1.1 billion in 1984) with Chaffee Offers Bill to Halt
Telecommunication Sales in U.S. UntilJapaneseMarket is Opened, [2 Current Reports]
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 449 (Mar. 27, 1985) (telecommunications trade deficit for 1984
equalled $900 million). The Dept. of Commerce estimated the 1985 telecommunications
trade deficit at $1.1 billion. Telecommunication Trade Bill Gets Support in Two House
Panels,Markups Set, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1229, 1230 (Oct. 2,
1985).
224. USITC Pub. 1542, supra note 59, at xii.
225. Id. at x (United States producers' share decreased from 97 percent to 89.2
percent).
226. Telecommunications Trade Hearings, supra note 81, at 1-2 (statement of
Timothy E. Wirth) ($56 million deficit); see supra notes 61-71 and accompanying text.
227. See S. REP. No. 204, supra note 70, at 2-3.
228. Japan exported $404.5 million of telecommunications equipment to the United
States in fiscal 1983 while the United States exported a mere $21.6 million to Japan.
Murtha, supra note 64, at 48 (estimate by the Electronics Industry Association of
Japan).
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ufacturers are closed to United States telecommunications products. 2 9 As
one United States official argued:
[The] growth in foreign entries

. . .

has not been matched by equivalent

market opportunities for U.S. equipment producers abroad. Foreign markets in the industrialized nations remain largely closed to U.S. telecommunications products, reflecting factors such as the strong preference of domestic post and telecommunications authorities for domestic suppliers, buy
national industrial policies, and a variety of tariff and non-tariff barriers.
As a result of this lack of balance in market opportunities, the U.S. balance of trade
in telecommunications equipment is deteriorating
2 30
dramatically.

The overall trade deficit with Japan, and the telecommunications
trade balance in particular, can be attributed to factors other than Japanese manufacturers. First, Japan maintains an overall trade surplus because the value of the products it manufactures far exceeds the total consumption of the country.2" 1 Although Japan consistently has a negative
trade balance in services and is poor in natural resources, it incurs a
positive trade balance from the market success of its manufactured products. 23 2 Second, while exportation of manufactured products is a national
priority in Japan, importation is not.233 This policy can be interpreted to
mean that Japan's top trade priority is the protection of its home market.
Third, the business environment in Japan does not naturally lend itself
to free interaction between domestic and foreign entities. Loyalty to longterm personal relations, lifetime employment policies, extensive government-business partnerships, tightly-knit business circles, and an overall
sense of team play are commendable qualities for a national economy,
but they have adverse effects in the "context of an interdependent world
economy. ' 23 4
Before the Electric Telecommunication Business Act, United States
firms had difficulty penetrating the Japanese market despite Japan's lack
of a central manufacturer of supplies and equipment comparable to
229. See S. REP. No. 204, supra note 70, at 2-3.
230. Chaffee Offers Bill to Halt Telecommunication Sales in U.S. Until Japanese
Market is Opened, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 449 (Mar. 27, 1985).
231. Ahearn, supra note 175, at 41.
232. Id. "A resource-poor country must export manufactured goods to pay for its
imported oil and primary products." Id. at 44. Japan would still maintain a large trade
surplus in manufactured goods even if its overall trade balance was zero. Id. at 44-45.
233. Id. at 43. Many Japanese believe that-buying foreign products does not benefit
Japan. Id.
234. Id.
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Western Electric. 235 Once NTT coordinated technological development
and common standards for equipment and allocated sectors of the telecommunications market among a select group of Japanese producers,
these firms experienced lower overall manufacturing and marketing
costs.2" 6 This preferred group, or telecommunications family, developed
products that shared common components and production facilities,
thereby substantially reducing their expenses.2" 7 The major Japanese
firms quickly penetrated foreign telecommunications markets, particularly the United States, because they could offer products at lower prices
due to NTT's procurement policies with its domestic industry.213
In 1980 the United States and Japan entered into the NTT Procurement Agreement 2 9 in an effort to open Japan's telecommunications
market. NTT procurement of United States equipment increased from
$17 million in 1981 to $180 million in 1984.240 United States firms,
however, failed to realize most of this growth in areas of primary concern. 241 Most of the equipment and supplies ordered by NTT were either unique or purchased only on a periodical basis.24 2 NTT never purchased a substantial quantity of equipment central to the
telecommunications network, which would promote the development of
long-term relationships with United States firms. 243 Furthermore, NTT

235. See Murtha, supra note 64, at 48.
236. Borrus & Zysman, supra note 87, at 143, 144.
237. Id.
238. Id. Japanese firms could afford to sell equipment abroad at lower prices because NTT purchased high volumes of equipment at premium prices within Japan,
thereby subsidizing these "exporting expeditions." See id. at 144, 157.
239. Trade: Procurement in Telecommunications, Dec. 19, 1980, United States-Japan, 32 U.S.T. 4495, T.I.A.S. No. 9961. The procurement policies of NTT were a
major source of friction between Japan and United States in the late 1970s. NTT traditionally awarded less than one percent of its total tenders to foreign suppliers. Ahearn,
supra note 175, at 53. Instead, NTT awarded approximately 96 percent of its procurement to domestic suppliers. Id. This "family" of suppliers included NEC, Oki, Fujitsu,
and Hitachi. Id.
240. S. REP. No. 204, supra note 70, at 4; ($140 million in 1983); Borrus & Zysman, supra note 87, at 160; Murtha, supra note 64, at 48.
241. Murtha, supra note 64, at 48; see S. REP. No. 204, supra note 70, at 4. One
area in which United States manufacturers hoped NTT procurement would materialize
was research and development projects. This growth never came about.
242. See S. REP. No. 204, supra note 70, at 4.
243. Ahearn, supra note 175, at 53. Most of the equipment which NTT procured
from foreign telecommunications suppliers consisted of copier paper, telephone poles,
magnetic tape, data processing components, computers and systems, peripherals, and
semiconductor manufacturing and test equipment. Borrus & Zysman, supra note 87, at
160.
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purchases only a small percentage of its total procurement from foreign
entities. 44 Even the marginal importance of procurement contracts with
NTT, however, will decline as NTT controls a smaller portion of the
overall telecommunications market in Japan.245 Encouraging more
favorable procurement practices by NTT remains a priority goal for the
United States, but competitors realize that NTT is no longer the only
viable entrance into the Japanese market.
Many United States officials and telecommunications firms believe
that the enactment of the Electric Telecommunication Business Act may
ease a substantial portion of the trade deficit's burden on this country.
Consequently, they seek to open Japan's market as soon as possible
through negotiations and threatening trade bills.2 46 United States officials
24 7
cite the lack of market access as the principal cause of the trade deficit.
By imposing both visible and invisible trade barriers, Japan severely
limits home market access to United States exports and alters the free
flow market forces.148 The Senate Committee on Finance reported that
"[a]lthough the Japanese market might, on the surface, appear responsive to the price, quality and other competitive factors that generally govern free markets, Japanese barriers render the Japanese market much
less free and transparent."24 9 Studies show, however, that Japanese consumers in general do not discriminate between foreign and domestic
goods.2 50 That data, coupled with the conviction of United States firms

Congress is well-aware of this practice and does not look favorably upon it.
[T]he resistance to buying American telecommunications products has continued in
spite of the "NTT agreement" under which the Japanese Government committed
itself to opening up NTT's procurement practices. . . .Since the NTT agreement
has been in force, no American company has sold a single piece of network switching or transmission equipment in Japan. Let me repeat that. No American company, since that first agreement, the NTT agreement, has sold a single piece of
network switching or transmission equipment in Japan that I know of. These
protectionist procurement policies are obviously aimed at promoting the development of domestic telecommunication industries within each of these countries.
However, these policies I said directly cost us the exports, the jobs, and ultimately
will cost us our competitive edge and will lead to the decline of these vital industries in which we are so far ahead today.
Telecommunications Trade Hearings, supra note 81, at 10 (statement of Robert S.
Strauss).
244. S.REP. No. 204, supra note 70, at 4.
245. Id.
246. See generally infra notes 263-354 and accompanying text.
247. See infra section V.
248. S.REP. No. 102, supra note 175, at 4.
249. Id.
250. Schoenbaum, Trade Friction With Japan and the American Policy Response,
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that their telecommunications equipment is superior to the Japanese
products, 251 suggests that the real barrier to free trade is not the Japanese consumer but the Japanese Government.
Japan, on the other hand, pledges that its markets are open to foreign
competition and that foreign firms receive the same treatment as domestic firms.252 Japan also asserts that the overvalued dollar 53 and the lack
of aggressive exportation policies of United States firms 254 significantly
contributed to the United States' trade deficit.
V. THE UNITED STATES RESPONSE TO THE JAPANESE
LEGISLATION AND THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADE DEFICIT
The United States telecommunications firms, the Reagan Administration and Congress reacted strongly to the negative trade balance in general and to Japan and the telecommunications deficit in particular. Congress has taken a "get-tough" stance on the United States-Japan trade
dispute. Both the Senate and the House of Representatives responded to
the inaccessibility of the Japanese market by introducing telecommunications trade bills in 1985 and 1986.255 All of the bills call for some form

82 MICH. L. REv. 1647, 1660, 1660 n.39 (1984).
251. See Chaffee Offers Bill to Halt Telecommunication Sales in U.S. Until Japanese Market is Opened, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 449 (Mar. 27,
1985). But see USITC Pub. 1542, supra note 59, at 45.
252. U.S. May Retaliate IfJapan Denies Access to Telecommunications Market, Officials Say, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 225 (Feb. 13, 1985).
253. See U.S., Japan Trade Open Talks with Focus on Telecommunictions, Car
VRA Tie-In Seen, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 173, 174 (Jan. 30,
1985).
254. Id.
255. Senator John Chaffee (Rep.-RI), a strong opponent of protectionist measures,
introduced an out-of-character bill in the Senate on March 20, 1985, "[t]o prohibit the
entry [in the United States] of Japanese telecommunication products until Japanese markets are open to United States telecommunication products." S. 728, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
1 (1985). This bill was a product of congressional frustration with Japanese bureaucrats.
See Chaffee Offers Bill to Halt Telecommunication Sales in U.S. UntilJapaneseMarket
is Opened, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 449 (Mar. 27, 1985). It has not
received much support and therefore is not considered one of the major bills addressing
the telecommunications trade issue which might be enacted.
On April 17, 1985, Senator John Danforth (Rep.-MO) introduced a major telecompromote expansion of international trade in telecommunicamunications trade bill "[tlo
tions equipment and services." S. 942, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1985). The bill is discussed in section V.A.1 of this note.
Representative Timothy Wirth (Dem.-CO) and James Florio (Dem.-NJ) introduced
another major telecommunications trade bill on July 31, 1985, entitled "Telecommunications Trade Act of 1985." H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). Versions of this bill
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of retaliation by the United States. Congress may soon enact one of these
bills.
Resolving the telecommunications trade deficit is not easy because
trade with Japan is not a simple two-player game. Eliminating or reducing the trade deficit involves several considerations. First, any trade legislation that provides protection to domestic firms under the pretense of
retaliatory measures may not be consistent with GATT.2 5 Furthermore,
this type of legislation undermines confidence in the efficacy of the freetrade ideal.2 57
Second, the United States must tailor its actions to avoid adversely
affecting either domestic consumers or other countries trading with the
United States. 5 Directing retaliatory measures toward Japanese exports for which there are foreign or domestic alternative sources may
minimize these adverse effects. 259 Third, the United States traditionally
supports free trade.2 0 Any protectionist legislation or retaliatory action
will appear to contradict current United States trade policy. 28 1 While
Congress supports a restrictive trade bill, the Reagan Administration approaches the problem with the opposite strategy. The Reagan Administration believes that by applying political pressure on foreign governments to open their markets, it will avoid implementing protectionist
262
measures in this country.

are discussed in section V.A.2 of this note.
Legislators introduced other telecommunications trade legislation in Congress in 1985
and 1986. See, e.g., H.R. 3439, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); S. 1404, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985) (the Packwood bill "to require the President to respond to unfair trade
practices of Japan"); S. 234, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
256.
257.
attack.

See Schoenbaum, supra note 250, at 1648.
Id. The free-trade ideal presently is under severe intellectual and political

258. See Administration, Congress Starting to Weigh Retaliatory Measures as
Trade Talks Stall, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 374 (Mar. 13, 1985);
see also S. REP. No. 102, supra note 175, at 11.
259.

See S. REP. No. 102, supra note 175, at 11.

260. See Administration, Congress Starting to Weigh Retaliatory Measures as
Trade Talks Stall, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 374 (Mar. 13, 1985)
(United States interested in lowering trade barriers).
261. The policy of retaliatory protectionism, however, is gaining political appeal in
the world trade arena. See Schoenbaum, supra note 250, at 1647.

262. See Farnsworth, Section 301 Is Polished As U.S. Trade Weapon, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 27, 1985, at D1, col. 1.
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A. Legislative Responses in 1985 and 1986
1. The Danforth Bill
In 1985 Senator John Danforth 3 introduced legislation designed to
stimulate expansion of international telecommunications trade. 2 " The
Danforth Bill calls for the "[s]ystematic use of access to the United
States market as negotiating leverage and strict enforcement of existing
trade agreements" to achieve a more open world trading system. 265 The
Bill purportedly will promote technological growth in the United States
telecommunications industry, thereby producing more domestic employment opportunities. 2 8" The legislation's fundamental negotiating policy is
the attainment of "substantially equivalent competitive opportunities"
("SECO"). 267 The United States can achieve "SECO" in foreign markets in other countries through a variety of actions.
The proposed legislation requires the United States Trade Representative (USTR)26 8 to conduct an investigation within four months of the
Bill's enactment to determine which countries, by their acts, policies, and
practices in the international marketplace, deny "SECO" to United

263. See supra note 255.
264. See S. 942, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); S. REP. No. 204, supra note 70.
Danforth introduced other legislation in 1984 that would have more than doubled tariffs

on telecommunications equipment imported from countries that failed to enter into trade
agreements with the United States. Redrafled Telecommunications Bill Out Soon, [2
Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 239 (Feb. 13, 1985). Danforth redrafted the
1984 bill into the one (S. 942) he offered in 1985. The Senate Finance Committee approved and amended S. 942 on September 17, 1985, primarily redrafting its implementation timetables. Senate Finance Approves Bill to Improve Exports of U.S. Telecommunications Products, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1155 (Sept. 18, 1985).
265. S. REP. No. 204, supra note 70, at 1. Danforth contended that Japan would
not voluntarily open its markets. The Danforth Bill provides the United States with
negotiating authority and leverage to achieve foreign market access.
266. See id. at 7 ("The growing imbalance of trade opportunities resulting from
deregulation and divestiture in the United States market and the continuation of unfair
and discriminatory practices in foreign telecommunications markets threatens the loss of
jobs in the United States telecommunications industry and its ability to compete").
267. Id. at 7. The committee report suggests that the United States continue its open
market policy even if other countries refuse to provide United States manufacturers with
"SECO."

268. The United States Trade Representative is a Cabinet-level official with the
rank of Ambassador. LONG RANGE GOALS, supra note 13, at 74. The USTR is responsible for setting and administering the country's international trade policy. He is the
principal Presidential advisor on international trade policy and has "lead responsibility
for the conduct of international trade negotiations." Id. at 75; see generally 15 C.F.R. §
2001.3 (1986) (functions of the USTR).
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States competitors. 2 "9 This determination depends upon a variety of fac-

tors including the actual economic benefit of open markets and present
trade practices. 27 0 Removal of formal trade barriers alone, therefore, may

not qualify the particular foreign market as providing "SECO" under
the Bill.2" 1 As one factor in the determination, the USTR must evaluate
the benefits accruing to foreign firms from the improved market access in
the United States caused by the AT&T divestiture and telecomnunications deregulation. 27 2 The Bill also focuses on invisible barriers, requiring the USTR to examine the patterns of trade that should exist without
formal barriers. 27 ' As the Senate Report accompanying the Danforth
Bill explained:
The requirement that actual patterns of trade be taken into account in
determining market openness is designed to go beyond traditional means
of analysis that focus primarily on nominal or formal barriers to access.
By bringing empirical data and evidence to bear in the determination, the
.. . [USTR should] find evidence of trade distorting practices that are of
a more informal or less visible nature. 4
The USTR, therefore, may compare market share statistics of domestic and foreign firms in both the United States and Japan.2 75 The foreign
country market conditions, however, do not have to mirror market condi-

tions in the United States market.2 78 The Danforth Bill recognizes that
countries with which the United States trades operate under different

269. S. 942, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(1) (1985); S. REP. No. 204, supra note
70, at 8.
270. S. 942, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1985). This section provides
that:
In conducting the analysis. .. , the United States Trade Representative shall take
into account the following factors: (A) the economic benefits (actual or potential)
accruing to firms in each foreign country and to their United States subsidiaries
from the open access to the United States telecommunications market that has
resulted from the liberalization and restructuring of such market;. and (B) actual
patterns trade, including sales of telecommunications products and services in foreign countries by United States firms and their subsidiaries in relation to the international competitive position and export potential of such products and services.
271. See S. REP. No. 204, supra note 70, at 8.
272. See S. 942, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(b)(1)(A) (1985); S. REP. No. 204,
supra note 70, at 7.
273. S. REP. No. 204, supra note 70, at 8.
274. Id. at 9; see S. 942, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(b)(1)(B) (1985).
275. S. REP. No. 204, supra note 70, at 9. Sales by foreign-owned subsidiaries based
in the United States is not a measure of the openness of United States or foreign markets.

Id.
276.

Id. at 7.
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economic structures and that their markets consequently reflect dissimilar national objectives. 2"
Once the USTR determines that a country denies "SECO" to United
States firms, then the USTR must also decide whether that country's
acts, policies or practices also contravene existing trade agreements with
the United States.2 78 The USTR considers essentially the same criteria
in evaluating the patterns of trade as those considered in its original inquiry as to whether the particular country denies "SECO" to United
States firms.2 79
The USTR may conclude that a country's policy denies "SECO" to
the United States but does not violate existing agreements. Upon this
determination, the Danforth Bill directs the President to enter into trade
agreement negotiations with that country for the purpose of attaining
"SECO" in its telecommunications market.2 8 0 The President has author-

277. See id.
278. See S. 942, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a)(2) (1985). This section provides that
the USTR,
for purposes of section 103, shall determine which of such acts, policies, or practices-(A) is inconsistent with the provisions of, otherwise denies benefits to the
United States under, any trade agreement, (B) is unjustifiable and burdens or restricts United States commerce, or (C) otherwise has the effect of(i) nullifying or impairing any benefit from concessions or commitments to the
United States under any agreement, or
(ii) impeding attainment of any objective of any agreement to which the United
States is a party.
279. See id. § 101(b)(2). The USTR shall:
consider as dispositive any evidence of actual patterns of trade (including sales of
telecommunications products and services in a foreign country by United States
firms and their subsidiaries) that do not reflect patterns of trade which would
reasonably be anticipated to flow from the concessions or commitments of such
country based on the international competitive position and export of such products and services.
280. Id. § 102(a)(1). The President is guided by general objectives in these
negotiations:
(i) to obtain multilateral or bilateral agreements (or the modification of existing
agreements) that provide to the telecommunications products and services of
United States firms and their subsidiaries competitive opportunities in foreign
markets that are substantially equivalent to the competitive opportunities available
in the United States market to such products and services of foreign firms and
their United States subsidiaries;
(ii) to correct the imbalance in competitive opportunities accruing from uncompensated reductions in barriers to the access of foreign firms and their subsidiaries to
the United States telecommunications market; and
(iii) to facilitate the increase in United States exports of telecommunications products and services to a level commensurate with the competitive position of the
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ity for three years to negotiate a trade agreement. If he is not successful,
however, in entering into an agreement that achieves "SECO," he must,
no later than two years after the Bill's enactment, take whatever actions
provided for in the Bill that are necessary to achieve "SECO.""28 The
President may choose from a wide array of retaliatory measures which
include:2 2 (1) terminating, withdrawing or suspending provisions of
trade agreements which prohibit or limit United States imposition of
tariff or nontariff barriers on foreign telecommunications products; 2s8 (2)
initiating an action under section 301(b) or (c) of the Trade Act of
1974;2"" and (3) prohibiting the purchase of foreign telecommunications

United States telecommunications industry.
Id. § 102(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii). The President is also guided by specific objectives, which are:
(i) national treatment for such products and services of United States firms and
their subsidiaries;
(ii) most-favored-nation treatment for such products and services;
(iii) nondiscriminatory government procurement policies with respect to such
products and services;
(iv) equipment standards and procedures for certification of equipment that do not
exceed the minimum standards and procedures necessary to protect the telecommunications network;
(v) reduction or elimination of custom duties on telecommunications products;
(vi) elimination of subsidies, dumping, violations of intellectual property rights,
and other unfair trade practices that distort international trade in
telecommunications;
(vii) elimination of investment barriers that restrict the establishment of foreignowned business entities which market telecommunications products and services;
and
(viii) monitoring and dispute settlement mechanisms to facilitate compliance with
telecommunications trade agreements.
Id. § 102(a)(2)(B)(i)-(viii). Congress must approve any such agreements. S. REP. No.
204, supra note 70, at 6.
281. S. 942, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(b)(1) (1985); see S. REP. No. 204, supra
note 70, at 6. The President first must take those actions which will most directly affect
telecommunications trade with the country. S. 942, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(b)(2)
(1985).
282. See S. 942, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(b)(3)(A)-(H) (1985).
283. Id. § 102(b)(3)(A).
284. Id. § 102(b)(3)(B). Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618,
§ 301, 88 Stat. 1978 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (Supp. III 1985)), is the
primary statute providing the President authority to retaliate against unfair trade practices of foreign countries. The President has broad discretionary authority under section
301 to implement sanctions. For a detailed discussion of section 301, see Coffield, Using

Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 as a Response to Foreign Government Trade
Actions: When, Why and How, 6 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 381 (1981) (this
article provides a good overview of section 301 even though that section has since been
amended).
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imports by the United States Government. 2s5 Additionally, the President
can compensate those countries whose exports are affected adversely by
United States retaliatory actions. 2 6 Thus, under a flexible plan, the
President can implement the most effective actions on the specific country,28 7 while also minimizing the negative impact on United States consumers and nontargeted countries.28
The proposed act also addresses violations of existing trade agreements. The USTR, within thirty days of the determination of a violation, must take actions necessary to offset the violative policies and restore the balance of concessions between the violating country and the
United States. 289 The retaliatory measures available to the USTR2 90 are
more limited than those available to the President. 2 1 The USTR may
only initiate a section 301 action2 92 or modify or eliminate restrictions on
the United States by trade agreements between the United States and the
violating country.2 93
If a country denies "SECO" and violates a trade agreement covering
only a portion of its telecommunications market, the United States can
attempt both retaliation and negotiation under the Danforth Bill.2 '
Given present Congressional frustration with the trade deficit, it is quite
possible that Japan will be the object of both types of prescribed
sanctions. 29 5
Although the Danforth Bill calls for mandatory retaliation by the
President and the USTR for unfair trade and violations of trade agreements, it focuses on the actual source of the United States telecommunications trade deficit with Japan-the lack of market access for United
States competitors. The legislation implicitly recognizes that eliminating
the negative trade balance with Japan is the priority objective, but the
trade deficit itself does not trigger mandatory actions or negotiations by

285. Id. § 102(b)(3)(C).
286.
287.

S. REP. No. 204, supra note 70, at 6.
Id. at 12.

288. See id.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

S. 942, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(a) (1985).
See id. § 103(c)(1).
Compare id. § 103(c)(1) with id. § 102(b)(3).
Id. § 103(c)(1)(B)-(C).
Id. § 103(c)(1)(A).

294. S. REP. No. 204, supra note 70, at 9. If a country denies "SECO" yet adheres
to the terms of trade agreements, only the negotiation track would apply. Id.
295. See Senators, Dissatisfiedwith AdministrationActions, See Need For TelecommunicationsLegislation, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 653, 654 (May 8,

1985).
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the United States. Although Japanese success in the automobile industry,
where that country has an acknowledged technological advantage, accounts for much of the trade deficit, the Danforth Bill properly focuses
only on the trade deficit in the telecommunications sector. The Bill eliminates the possibility that the United States will retaliate against
a foreign telecommunications industry on "nontelecommunication"
grounds. 296 Moreover, the legislation restricts negotiations and retaliations by the United States to the proper target-the particular country
denying telecommunications market access to United States firms.
2.

The Telecommunications Trade Act of 1986

In 1986 Congress considered two versions of the Telecommunications
Trade Act of 1986. Both the House Committee on Energy and Commerce and the House Committee on Ways and Means reviewed and approved amended versions of the original bill.2 9 The respective amendments, however, render the bills distinctive pieces of legislation for full
House consideration. Both versions of the Telecommunications Trade
Act of 1986 suggest directions that Congress may take concerning the
United States-Japan telecommunications trade issue.

296. Examples of "nontelecommunications" grounds include: (1) the success of a foreign country's industry (other than the telecommunications industry) in the United
States; and (2) the lack of success of a United States industry (other than the telecommunications industry) in a foreign country.
297. H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). The original bill was entitled the
"Telecommunications Trade Act of 1985" because it was introduced in Congress in
1985. See id. § 1(a).
298. Telecommunications Trade Act of 1986, H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1986), reprinted in TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADE AcT OF 1986, H.R. Ra'. No.
471, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 1-8 (1986) (Committee on Energy and Commerce
version). This version of H.R. 3131 is almost identical to the original H.R. 3131. After
Timothy E. Wirth, James J. Florio, and others introduced the Telecommunications
Trade Act in Congress on July 31, 1985, the Committee on Energy and Commerce was
the first group to examine and redraft the proposed legislation. See also Telecommunications Trade Act of 1986, H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted in TELECOMMUNICATIONS TRADE

AcT

OF

1986, H.R. REP. No. 471, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt.

2, at 1-8 (1986) (the Committee on Ways and Means version). Subsequent to the Committee on Energy and Commerce's examination and report, supra, the Committee on
Ways and Means and the Subcommittee on Trade considered H.R. 3131. The Subcommittee on Trade conducted hearings in March 1986 and thereafter issued a favorable
report, along with minor revisions of H.R. 3131. In April 1986, the Committee on Ways
and Means likewise issued a favorable report. The Committee on Ways and Means,
however, substantially amended the proposed legislation.
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The Committee on Energy and Commerce Version of H.R. 3131

The Committee on Energy and Commerce slightly amended the original version of the Telecommunications Trade Act. The amended legislation focuses on the identification and reduction of trade barriers to
United States telecommunications firms.29 Further, the Bill emphasizes
the need for the United States to negotiate for open access to foreign
countries"' 0 while simultaneously maintaining open domestic markets.30 1
The Bill provides two types of measures capable of opening foreign
markets. Measures in Title I relate to telecommunications equipment
certification standards and procurement of international satellite facilities. Measures taken under Title I, unlike those under Title II, do not
require an investigation by the Secretary of Commerce or a determination of harm by the President prior to their implementation.
Title I requires the FCC to perform two tasks. First, the FCC must
monitor procurement practices of foreign countries with United States
firms under operating agreements for international satellite facilities. 30 2
If the FCC finds that a country has imposed satellite procurement restrictions, it may revoke or suspend any license, permit or authority previously awarded the United States provider which allow that provider to
enter into such operating agreements until the procurement restrictions
are removed.30 3
Title I also requires the FCC to establish fair and effective certification standards for telecommunications equipment manufactured or as-

299. H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(b) (1986), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
471, pt. 1, supra note 298, at 2-3 (stated purposes of H.R. 3131). Compare id. with
H.R. 3131, 99th Cong. 1st Sess. § 2(b) (1985).
300. Section 2(a)(6) of the Bill, which enumerates congressional findings, provides
that:
open and unrestricted access to foreign telecommunications markets by United
States telecommunications suppliers is necessary and critical for the continued economic health, growth, and international competitiveness of the United States telecommunications industry and to the sustained growth and expansion of the United
States economy.
H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(6) (1985), reprinted in H.R. Rep. No. 471, pt.
1, supra note 298, at 2.
301. Congress also found that "United States policies should be directed to opening
up foreign markets and not the closing of domestic United States markets." H.R. 3131,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(12) (1986), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 471, pt. 1, supra
note 298, at 2; see also H.R. REP. No. 471, pt. 1, supra note 298, at 9.
302. See H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 101 (1986), reprintedin H.R. REP. No.
471, pt. 1, supra note 298, at 3-4.
303. Id. § 101(b), reprinted at 4. The FCC also has the option to take other appropriate action. H.R. REP. No. 471, pt. 1, supra note 298, at 23.

1987]

JAPANESE TELECOMMUNICATIONS

sembled outside the United States." °4 As part of this certification method,
the FCC requires a country from which telecommunications equipment
originates to accept United States equipment entering that country without additional testing or inspection."' 5 If the foreign country accepts
United States-tested equipment claimed to meet the country's performance and reliability standards, then the FCC will likewise accept the
country's equipment in the United States without also conducting further
testing. Thus, any country that trades telecommunications equipment
with the United States must apply the FCC "harm to the network"3'06
standard within its own borders. If a country fails to provide the reciprocal certification process and equipment standards, the FCC may restrict
the importation of equipment produced by that country into the United
States. 07 The FCC may design a certification program for a particular
country, subject to approval by the Secretary of Commerce. 08° Although
the Bill provides this procedural safeguard, the legislators possibly did
not intend to enable the FCC to establish international trade restrictions
that contradict administrative policy.
Negotiated access to foreign telecommunications markets is the preferred alternative. Under certain circumstances, however, the President,
under Title II, must take action either through the FCC or under the
Trade Act of 1974 to open foreign markets to United States suppliers.
Only if negotiations fail to provide "equivalent telecommunications market access," 30 9 however, will the United States take action to restrict for-

304. H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess § 102(a) (1986), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
471, pt. 1, supra note 298, at 4.
305. Id. § 102(b), reprinted at 4; see also H.R. REP. No. 471, pt. 1, supra note
298, at 24.
306. Supra notes 13, 63.
307. H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102(b)(2)-(5) (1986), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 471, pt. 1, supra note 298, at 4-5; see also H.R. REP. No. 471, pt. 1, supra
note 298, at 24-25.
308. See H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 102(b)(3)-(4) (1986), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 471, pt. 1, supra note 298, at 4-5.
309. The legislation defines this term as:
the opportunities for the exportation from the United States of telecommunications
equipment and services to a foreign country are substantially equivalent to the
opportunities under which foreign suppliers of that country can compete in the
provision of telecommunications equipment and services in the United States, as
measured by the extent of barriers for entry and participation in the telecommunications market.
Id. § 3(3), reprinted at 3. The definition of "equivalent telecommunications market access" under H.R. 3131, therefore, is consistent with the conditions necessary for finding
"SECO" under S. 942. H.R. REP. No. 471, pt. 1, supra note 298, at 9.
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eign access to its markets under the proposed legislation."' 0
The Bill requires the Secretary of Commerce (the Secretary) to initiate, within thirty days of the Bill's enactment, an investigation to identify
those countries which deny equivalent telecommunications market access
to the United States.$"' Private parties may request that the Secretary
initiate an investigation of a specific foreign country. 1 ' In either case,
the Secretary must engage in a rather lengthy investigation period. A
mandatory investigation by the Secretary may continue up to approximately eight months before the President or the FCC takes any action;
an investigation by petition may take longer.31 3 While the Department of
Commerce conducts its investigation, the President may negotiate for
open access to foreign markets. 14
The Secretary must consider at least three factors to determine
whether a foreign country is denying the United States equivalent telecommunications market access.3 15 These factors are similar to those considered by the USTR under the Danforth Bill and read as follows: 1 '
(1) the competitiveness of the prices of telecommunications equipment and
services sold by United States suppliers in the foreign country, and their
marketing efforts in such country;
(2) the success of United States suppliers in providing telecommunications
equipment and services in the foreign country, measured in comparison to
their relative success in competing in other foreign countries [sic]; and in
the United States, for like equipment and services; and
(3) the impact on employment in the United States telecommunications

310. H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 2(a)(13) (1986), reprinted in H.R. REP.
471, pt. 1, supra note 298, at 2.
311. Id. § 201(a)(1), reprinted at 5.
312. See id. § 201(b)(1)(A), reprinted at 5. An interested party, however, may not
file a petition until six months from the date of the Bill's enactment. See id. § 201
(b)(I)(B), reprinted at 5. The original H.R. 3131 set a one year lapse period for such
requests.

313. Compare id. §§ 201(a)(1), 201(e), 202(a), 203(b) with id. §§ 201(b)(2), 201(e),
202(a), 202(b).
314. The Reagan Administration opposes sectoral reciprocity legislation which may
tie the President's hands by requiring him to conduct telecommunications negotiations.

See Trade Policy Agenda and Outlook for 1986: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Trade, House Comm. on Ways and Means, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1986) (statement of
Ambassador Clayton Yeutter, United States Trade Representative).
315. See H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(f(1)-(3) (1986), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 471, pt. 1, supra note 298, at 6.
316. Compare infra note 317 and accompanying text with supra notes 271-77 and
accompanying text.
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industry.

17

If the Secretary determines that a foreign country is denying substantially equivalent market access to United States suppliers, the President
must determine appropriate means to achieve equivalent access. The
President, however, has full discretion to choose what measures the
United States should implement under the Bill. The Bill authorizes the
President to take one or more of several actions under section 301(b) or

(c) of the Trade Act of 1974 within sixty days of the Secretary's determination."" For example, the President may impose duties or import restrictions on telecommunications equipment entering the United States
from that country 19 or limit or deny United States market access to telecommunications firms of that country. 20
If the President does not take action under section 301, he must direct
the FCC to take actions which he determines are necessary or appropriate.3 21 The only limitation placed on these actions by the Bill is that the
President must determine which of the available actions is appropriate.3 22 In the future, the FCC independently may implement retaliatory
actions against foreign countries. Such authority would be new to the
3 23
FCC since, under the current provisions of the Communications Act,
the FCC does not have clear legal authority to act in ongoing trade disputes.3 2 4 Although the FCC does not have clear legal authority to inter-

317. H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201(O(1)-(3) (1986), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 471, pt. 1, supra note 298, at 6. H.R. 3131, as originally drafted, required
consideration of an additional factor, which was eliminated by the committee: "the ability
of United States suppliers to gain market access in such foreign country through joint
ventures with the suppliers of such country through the establishment of manufacturing
plants and facilities located in the foreign country, and the impact of such access on
United States trade interests .... " H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(f)(2)(1985).
318. See H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 204 (1986), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
471, pt. 1, supra note 298, at 7.

319. Id. § 204(2), reprinted at 7.
320. Id. § 204(3)-(4), reprinted at 7.
321.

Id. § 202(a), reprinted at 6-7.

322. See id. §§ 202-03, reprinted at 6-7.
323.

Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-611 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).

324. FCC Staff Study Rejects Use of Equipment Standards in Communications
Trade Dispute, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1109 (Sept. 11, 1985). Due
to the widening telecommunications trade deficit, however, the FCC adopted a notice of
inquiry in December 1986, to determine whether the agency should retaliate against
protectionist actions by foreign countries. The FCC sought comments from United States
manufacturers and firms on the accessibility of the foreign telecomunications markets.
The FCC considered limiting access to the United States for foreign firms if the foreign
countries did not provide access to its markets on a reciprocal basis. See FCC Seeking
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vene in international trade disputes, the agency may be willing to take
the initiative and act if the telecommunications trade deficit continues to
increase. In March 1987 the FCC threatened to deny foreign manufacturers the right to license their telecommunication equipment in the
United States if the manufacturers' home countries failed to open their
markets to United States telecommunications equipment.3 25
Trade legislation supporters have suggested that the FCC could impose barriers on foreign countries that deny equivalent access to United
States competitors by restricting registration to foreign-made equipment. 2 6 Eliminating certain Japanese products from the United States
marketplace could be disastrous to the Japanese telecommunications
market.32 7 However, the FCC may not be able to impose these barriers
without a specific grant of authority3 2 or an amendment of the Commu3 29
nications Act.
The version of the Telecommunications Trade Act of 1986 issued by
the Committee on Energy and Commerce grants the FCC authority to
restrict or foreclose domestic market access to foreign telecommunications
equipment suppliers, 33 0 either through procurement practices or through
narrowly-tailored equipment certification and compliance standards.
Generally, FCC standards relate to the compatibility of foreign telecommunications equipment with the domestic network. 331 Thus, it is inconsistent with traditional policy to use the regulations for trade dispute
purposes. 3 2 Although the Bill requires the FCC to issue such regulations, 33 3 it is uncertain whether the FCC could issue the regulations, or
amend its present rules and regulations, to withhold foreign certification

Comments on Effect of Possible Telecommundation Trade Access Retaliation, [4 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 20 (Jan. 7, 1987).
325. FCC May Consider Denying Equipment Licenses as Reciprocity in Trade Tool,
Chairman Says, [4 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 352 (Mar. 11, 1987).
326. FCC Staff Study Rejects Use of Equipment Standards in Communciations
Trade Dispute, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1109 (Sept. 11, 1985).
327. U.S. May Retaliate If Japan Denies Access To Telecommunications Market,
Officials Say, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 225 (Feb. 13, 1985).
328. FCC Staff Study Rejects Use of Equipment Standards in Communications
Trade Dispute, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1109 (Sept. 11, 1985).
329. Id.
330. See H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 208(a) (1986), reprinted in H.R. REP.
No. 471, pt. 1, supra note 298, at 8.
331. FCC Staff Study Rejects Use of Equipment Standards in Communications
Trade Dispute, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1109 (Sept. 11, 1985).
332. See id.
333. H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 208(b) (1986), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
471, pt. 1, supra note 298, at 8.
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on lack of reciprocity grounds 3 " without impermissibly conflicting with
the Communications Act of 1934. If the FCC amends the rules and regulations, it will incur additional administrative costs to accommodate its
expanded scope of authority. Even if the FCC designed regulations to
obtain equal access in domestic markets, it would impose additional, perhaps unacceptable burdens on United States firms forced to comply with
the new standards. The speculative benefits to the balance of trade from
any new regulation must be weighed against these costs to United States
companies.
b.

The Committee on Ways and Means Version of H.R. 3131

The Committee on Ways and Means passed an amended version of
the Telecommunications Trade Act that closely resembles the Danforth
Bill.3 35 The Committee supports vigorous efforts to achieve foreign market access without relying on multilateral trade negotiations. 3- Although
multilateral trade negotiations "traditionally proceed at a relatively slow
pace, 331 7 negotiations allowed under the Committee on Ways- and
Means' Bill conceivably can last up to three and one-half years.3 8
Under the Ways and Means Bill, the USTR must identify the countries with a substantial potential market for United States telecommunications products and services that deny "fully competitive market opportunities" to United States telecommunications firms. 8 9 As provided in
the Danforth Bill and the Energy and Commerce Committee's version of
H.R. 3131, private parties can petition the USTR to conduct an investigation.34 0 The USTR must complete the investigation, whether self-initiated or by petition, within six months of its commencement.3 4
The Bill provides a list of primary and secondary negotiating objectives3 4 2 from which the USTR will establish specific objectives regarding

334. See FCC Staff Study Rejects Use of Equipment Standards in Communications
Trade Dispute, [2 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1109 (Sept. 11, 1985). But
see H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 208(b) (1986), reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 471,
pt. 1, supra note 298, at 8.
335. See supra notes 263-96 and accompanying text.
336. H.R. REP. No. 471, pt. 2, supra note 298, at 9.
337. Id.
338. See infra notes 345-46 and accompanying text.
339. H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 202(a)(1)(A) (1986), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 471, pt. 2, supra note 298, at 3.
340. Id. § 202(b)(2), reprinted at 4; see supra note 312 and accompanying text.
341. H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 202(a)(3), (b)(2) (1986), reprinted in H.R.
REP. No. 471, pt. 2, supra note 298, at 3-4.
342. See id. § 201, reprinted at 2-3.
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potential negotiations with the particular country.343 In determining

SEC. 201. NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES.
(a) PRIMARY OBjECTIvES.-The primary negotiating objectives of the United
States under this Act regarding telecommunications products and services are to
provide for(1) the nondiscriminatory procurement of telecommunications products and
related services by foreign entities that provide local exchange telecommunications services which are owned, regulated, or controlled by foreign governments;
(2) assurances that any requirement for the registration of telecommunications products, which are to be located on customer premises, for the purposes
of(A) attachment to a telecommunications network in a foreign country, and
(B) the marketing of the products in a foreign county, be limited to the
certification by the manufacturer that the products meet the standards established by the foreign country for preventing harm to the network personnel;
(3) transparency of, and open participation in, the standards-setting processes
used in foreign countries with respect to telecommunications products;
(4) the ability to have telecommunications products which are to be located on
customer premises, approved and registered by type, and, if appropriate, the
establishment of procedures between the United States and foreign countries for
the mutual recognition of type approvals;
(5) access to the basic telecommunications network in foreign countries on
reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions (including non-discriminatory prices) for the provision of value-added services by United States suppliers; and
(6) monitoring and effective dispute settlement provisions regarding matters
referred to in paragraphs (1) through (5).
(b) SECONDARY OBjECTIvEs.-The secondary negotiating objectives of the
United States under this Act regarding telecommunications products and services
are to obtain(1) national treatment for telecommunications products and services that are
provided by United States firms;
(2) most-favored-nation treatment for such products and services;
(3) nondiscriminatory procurement policies with respect to such products and
services and the inclusion under the Agreement on Government Procurement of
the procurement (by sale or lease by government-owned or controlled entities) of
all telecommunications products and services;
(4) the reduction or elimination of customs duties on telecommunciations
products;
(5) the elimination of subsidies, dumping, violations of intellectual property
rights, and other unfair trade practices that distort international trade international trade in telecommunicataions products and services;
(6) the elimination of investment barriers that restrict the establishment of
foreign-owned business entities which market such products and serivces; and
(7) monitoring and dispute settlement mechanisms to facilitate compliance
with telecommunications trade agreements.
343. Id. § 202(a)(1)(B), reprinted at 3.
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which objectives suit the United States trade relationship with a particular country, the USTR shall consider: "the needs of the affected [United
States] industry in that country; the competitiveness of [United States]
industries in domestic and world markets; the progress being made to
expand market opportunities through existing agreements or ongoing negotiations; and the availability of appropriate incentives and effective
'3 4
remedies." '
After the USTR identifies the countries which deny fully competitive
market opportunities to the United States and the negotiating objectives,
the President must enter into negotiations with these countries. 3 45 The
President has a minimum of one year to negotiate. Further, the President may request two one-year extensions of the negotiating period; consequently, three and one-half years may pass before he implements other
actions under the Bill.' 6
If the President is unable to enter into a trade agreement that achieves
the specific negotiating objectives established by the USTR with a country within eighteen months after the date of the Bill's enactment, he
must resort to other means authorized under the Bill to effectuate United
States objectives.3 4 The President has discretion as to which actions are
necessary and appropriate to accomplish the objectives. For example, the
President may terminate, withdraw or suspend all or any portion of certain trade agreements. 8 The President also may initiate any action
under section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,149 or he may restrict or
prohibit United States Government procurement from the foreign country.3 50 The President, however, must direct any action towards the telecommunications industry of the specific country. Thus, the Bill virtually
precludes the President from taking retaliatory actions which have
"across the board" effects.
The Bill also mandates that the USTR conduct annual reviews of relations with countries trading with the United States in the telecommunications sector.3 51 The annual review establishes a mechanism by which
the United States can enforce and effectively police trade agreements in-

344. H. R. REP. No. 471, pt. 2, supra note 298, at 20 (referring to §
202(a)(1)(B)(i)-(iv)).
345. H.R. 3131, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. § 203(a) (1986), reprinted in H.R. REP. No.
471, pt. 2, supra note 298, at 4.
346. Id. § 203(c)(2), reprinted at 5.
347. Id. § 203(b),(c)(1), reprinted at 4-5.
348. Id. § 203(b)(3)(A), reprinted at 4.
349. Id. § 203(b)(3)(B), reprinted at 5.
350. Id. § 203(b)(3)(C), reprinted at 5.
351. Id. § 204, reprinted at 6.
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volving telecommunications products and services. The USTR must review any agreement reached by the President with a foreign country to
determine whether the country is complying with the agreement or is
denying fully competitive market opportunities, under the agreement, to
United States firms. 52 If the USTR determines that violations of the
agreement exist or that the country is denying fully competitive market
opportunities to United States firms, it must take appropriate actions to
offset such actions and to restore the balance in telecommunications trade
concessions between the foreign country and the United States. 53 The
USTR has less discretion than the President to implement retaliatory
measures, but still can take actions under section 301 of the Trade Act of
1974 or terminate, withdraw or suspend trade agreements with the foreign country.3 '
The version of H.R. 3131 released by the Committee on Ways and
Means dearly provides a wide variety of measures which the President
or the USTR can consider. However, the Bill also requires that the
President or USTR tailor its actions narrowly so as not to affect adversely either nontelecommunications industries both within and without
the United States or countries that provide fully competitive market opportunities to United States firms.
B.

1987 Proposals

Although Congress did not enact the Danforth Bill (S. 942) or the
Telecommunications Trade Act (H.R. 3131) in 1986, it nevertheless
strongly supports telecommunications trade legislation. In January 1987
Congress introduced an omnibus trade bill containing the Telecommunications Trade Act. 55 Also in 1987 Senator Danforth again introduced a
telecommunications trade bill, one identical to S. 942.56
Although such proposed legislation receives strong congressional support, the Administration and the USTR oppose trade legislation requiring retaliation, against United States trading partners because the Administration and the USTR believe that such mandatory language will
hinder negotiation and close foreign markets further. 3 17 The President
also opposes time restraints imposed on his ability to negotiate open ac-

352.

Id. § 204(b).

353. Id. § 204(d)-(e), reprinted at 6-7.

354. Id. § 204(e).
355. H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. Title 11 (1987).
356. S. 596, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1987).
357. See Administration Competitiveness Proposal Preferable to H.R. 3, Smart
Tells Hearing, [4 Current Reports] Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 344-45 (Mar. 11, 1987).
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cess to foreign markets because the restraints may impede his ability to
conclude negotiations.3 58 Thus, despite lingering telecommunications
trade disputes with Japan and other countries, it remains unclear as to
whether and when the United States will prescribe a definitive telecommunications trade policy regarding foreign market access.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although Japan appears willing to allow full access to its telecommunications markets for foreign manufacturers, suppliers and operators, the
ETB Act does not readily effectuate this policy. Under the ETB Act, the
MPT has too much discretionary authority and too little incentive to
open Japan's markets. Furthermore, the purpose of several critical sections of the ETB Act is clearly to preserve the NTT and KDD systems.
In 1987, for example, the MPT refused to permit foreign ownership in a
Japanese telecommunications business to the full extent provided by the
ETB Act.359
Although United States telecommunications firms will be able to enter
the Japanese market, that entry will be slow. The immense start-up
costs for Type I or Special Type II businesses hinder many United
States firms from operating these services. Only those firms that have
large amounts of available capital and are willing to enter into long-term
investments will be capable of operating these services. Financing, however, is not the only obstacle that the United States telecommunications
companies face. Although products made in the United States may be
superior in quality, NTT and the other previously existing Japanese
telecommunications firms currently enjoy strong consumer relations with
the Japanese community. These firms also have experience in the Japanese market that foreign firms lack. This lack of experience seriously
disadvantages potential foreign Type I and Special Type II operators.
The privatization of NTT allows Japanese companies to concentrate on
the domestic market in addition to the traditional emphasis on exports to
foreign markets such as the United States. Japanese corporations, therefore, can introduce a broader range of products and services at home.
Negotiations with Japan have been successful with respect to certification standards, but the United States will not be able to assess the full
effects of these negotiations at least until actual calculation of the 1987
358. Id.
359. See Swimming Upstream: The Japanese Government Attempts to Block Foreign
Competitionfrom Entering its Telecom Market, DATAMATION, Apr. 1, 1987, at 24;Japan's Protected Telecoms, ECONOMIST, Jan. 3, 1987, at 12. See also supra notes 118-19
and accompanying text.
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trade results. Meanwhile, the trade deficit with Japan may overshadow
minor successes of United States manufacturers in Japan. Congress may
decide to enact the Danforth Bill or one of the House Committees' versions of the Telecommunications Trade Act by itself, or as part of the
omnibus trade bill, in 1987 or 1988. On the other hand, the Reagan
Administration would rather reopen GATT negotiations on telecommunications barriers with Japan. A "watered-down" trade bill, possibly
without the mandatory language contained in the bills discussed above,
may result as a compromise between the executive and legislative
branches. Such a trade bill, however, may be ineffective without provisions for mandatory retaliation by the President, the USTR, or the
FCC. Absent provision for mandatory retaliation, no definite threat of
action by the United States to foreign telecommunications firms exists.
Furthermore, the domestic telecommunications market is open to such an
extent that the United States has little leverage with which to negotiate
in new GATT talks.
There are several reasons for adopting sectional reciprocity trade legislation in the telecommunications area. First, the legislation will more
clearly define the United States position concerning its telecommunications trade policy. The United States has been unable to successfully
promote a more open world market in the telecommunications arena because it lacked a definitive policy on such issues. Second, the legislation
will provide the United States with leverage for negotiations. While flexibility in negotiating authority should be of utmost concern, Congress, in
enacting the legislation, should not dismiss retaliatory actions as a last
resort policy. The proposed legislation discussed above provide the
United States with negotiating leverage by their language requiring actions by the President, the USTR, or the FCC. Congressional anger
with Japan in 1985 and 1986 obviously encouraged the MPT to adopt
some United States telecommunications policies; future negotiations, in
the shadow of a clear threat of United States retaliation should those
negotiations fall, should be successful. Any telecommunications trade legislation, however, should provide the United States with ample time to
achieve mutually advantageous agreements with other countries. Because
the United States lacks experience negotiating in this area, it is difficult
to establish the necessary time frame.
The legislation should also amend the Communications Act of 1934 to
enable the FCC to promulgate new certification standards directed at
foreign competitors. The FCC should implement these new standards,
however, only as a temporary alternative to more restrictive retaliatory
measures by the United States. Flexibility in negotiations and the threat
of retaliation should provide the United States with adequate leverage to
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obtain foreign market access.
Last, by enacting telecommunications trade legislation, the United
States implicitly recognizes the sovereign authority and concerns of the
various countries with which the United States trades. By requiring first
the negotiation of open sectional reciprocity, the United States acknowledges foreign concerns while also promoting domestic telecommunications policies on an international level. Thus, any retaliatory action
taken as a secondary measure would be considered more of an act of selfpreservation.
In pursuing either of these measures-enacting telecommunications
trade legislation or negotiating with foreign governments-the United
States must be aware that any foreign telecommunications legislation attempting to introduce international competition in a foreign country's
market will create conflicts with sovereign concerns of that country.
Telecommunications networks are indispensable to national security. Japan, or any other country, is not going to open any floodgates to foreign
competitors. Thus, the United States must gain access gradually. However, it effectively can persuade the Japanese Government through negotiations and domestic trade policies to adopt United States telecommunications policies in an effort to relieve some of the current trade deficit
pressures.
Robert Edward Boone III

